

# Common Values and Social Cohesion in Ethnically Divided Societies

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**ABSTRACT.** This paper raises the question, „What keeps human collectivities from disintegrating in ethnically divided societies?“ By providing a review of the main western sociological theories that investigate the role ascribed to values in multiethnic societies in particular, the authors provide an overview of value-based nation-building in Russia. Data from the empirical investigation of value cohesion and common identity in Russia’s six regions tests President Putin’s nation-building program and attitudes towards a common state and common nationhood. The study tends to confirm the existence of a common pool of „Rossiiskie“ values.

**Key words:** VALUES, COHESION, IDENTITY, ETHNICALLY DIVIDED SOCIETIES, RUSSIA.

Much social science literature is based on the implicit assumption that a broad agreement of values in the population is a prerequisite for social cohesion and for the development of a unified national identity. Taras Kuzio, for one, asserts that „a cohesive society cannot be constructed without a minimum body of common values, encoded in legislation and constitution. These values cannot be wholly morally neutral as they inevitably endorse one type of behaviour and set of values.“ (Kuzio 2001: 147). In a book published in 2000, one of the authors of this article expressed similar thoughts himself. On the dust cover of *Political Construction Sites. Nation-building in Russia and the Post-Soviet States*, Pål Kolstø maintained that

In order to survive in the long run, modern states normally must have a population that possesses some sense of unity. Its citizens must adhere to some common values and common allegiance toward the same state institutions and symbols. This does not mean that all inhabitants must necessarily share the same culture, but they should at least regard themselves as members of the same nation. (Kolstø 2000)

However, later on some of the presuppositions raised doubts, in particular: is it really the case that all or most citizens of a state must adhere to some common values in order to secure the state’s survival? And if that is really the case, why is it so? Which common values are we then talking about?

The question of value consensus is particularly acute in ethnically divided states undergoing nation-building, such as was the case with virtually all Soviet successor states. All former Soviet republics except Armenia had, in the last Soviet census, ethnic minorities that made up from roughly 20 percent of the total population (Russia, Lithuania, and Azerbaijan), to 50 percent or more (Latvia, Kazakhstan). In such situations, strategies for the formation of a common nationhood and a shared national identity and loyalty to the state were inevitably top of the agenda. For the new state leaders it would be important to know the answers to two related questions: do the members of the various ethnic groups in the country adhere to the same or similar values? And if yes, can such a common value orientation across ethnic diversity contribute to national consolidation?

Intrigued by these questions, we decided to make them the centre-piece of a book on nation-building in Russia, which was the third volume in a series of studies on comparative nation-building in the post-Soviet world (Kolstø, Blakkisrud 2004)<sup>1</sup>. For this book, our team of researchers commissioned a large-scale public opinion survey in six Russian Federation subjects with 200 respondents in each<sup>2</sup>. The respondents were asked a package of questions about their value orientations taken from the World Value Survey, combined with a series of questions that we had formulated ourselves about attitudes towards Russian nation-building. Some of the results we got were rather counter-intuitive and also went against the grain of much of the accepted wisdom of Western sociology. In particular, the idea propounded by communitarianism and normative functionalism, that strong value consensus is a prerequisite for societal and political integration, did not find much support in our material. Most respondents in our survey did in fact hold rather similar value orientations, but in many cases this did not reflect on their attitudes towards Russian nation-building or support for a common Russian state. Most interestingly, we found that Dagestan was the federation subject in which the respondents most clearly adhered to different values than the average Russian citizens did, but nevertheless Dagestanis expressed remarkably strong support for a common Russian state.

At the same time also, the assumption in much literature on nationalism that people who hold separate national identities will want to establish their own state was not born out. The non-Russian respondents in our survey

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<sup>1</sup> The previous volumes were the following: Kolstø P. (ed.) (1999) *Nation-Building and Ethnic Integration in Post-Soviet Societies. An Investigation of Latvia and Kazakstan*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, and Kolstø P. (ed.) (2002) *National integration and violent conflict in post-Soviet societies: the cases of Estonia and Moldova*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

<sup>2</sup> For technical details, see Kolstø P., Blakkisrud H. (2004) *Nation-Building and Common Values in Russia*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 341–47.

tended—in spite of their similar value orientation—to have strongly felt ethnic identities but at the same time most of them expressed strong support for a common Russian state. They accepted a common and even a strong Russian state, but not a common Russian nationhood. While regionalism was strong, separatism was weak.

While our study focused on Russia, we believe that the findings are also relevant for our understanding of the relationship between common values, nation building and social cohesion in other ethnically divided states. Below, we first discuss some trends in Western (mostly Anglo-Saxon) research on the role of common values for social cohesion in general and in ethnically diverse societies in general before we proceed to present the most important findings of our study.

## Western thinking on common values and social cohesion

What is it that keeps human collectivities from disintegrating into a war of all against all? In other words, what is it that, in the face of individual egotism and struggle for survival, makes human societies possible? This question, one of the most fundamental in sociology, was poignantly formulated by Thomas Hobbes in the 17<sup>th</sup> century, and has occupied social scientists ever since. It has triggered a perennial quest for what has alternately been termed „the ties that bind“, „the cement of society“, „the social glue“, and so on.

A large number of different answers have been ventured, many of which may be subsumed under one of three different headings: external power, converging interests, or common values.<sup>3</sup> The discussion below does not try to cover all of these sociological traditions, but pursues a more limited objective: to investigate the role ascribed to *values* in theories of social cohesion in general and in multiethnic societies in particular.

*Normative functionalism.* A modern thinker who strongly emphasized the role of common values in the formation and maintenance of society was the American sociologist Talcott Parsons (1902–1979).

Parsons took for granted that each and every society constitutes a community of values. In *The Social System* (1952), he defined value as „an element

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<sup>3</sup> One and the same theoretician may well maintain that all of these three factors are present at the same time; indeed, most contemporary sociologists will shy away from one-factor explanations. Moreover, a general theory of social cohesion does not have to insist that these factors are present in the same mixture in all societies. There is no logical inconsistency, for instance, in maintaining that dictatorships are primarily held together by state power while democracies deep down are maintained by common interests and/or converging values in the population.

of a shared symbolic system which serves as a criterion or standard for selection among the alternatives of orientation which are intrinsically open in a situation.“ (Parsons 1952: 12) Parsons went far in asserting that the common value system, deep down, is constitutive of society as such:

The sharing of such common value patterns, entailing a sense of responsibility for the fulfillment of obligations, then creates a solidarity among those mutually oriented to the common values. The actors concerned will be said to constitute, within the area of relevance of these values, a *collectivity*. (Parsons 1952: 41)<sup>4</sup>

The individual becomes a social actor by adopting and internalizing the expectations, norms, and values that dominate around him. It is only through such internalization that a genuine motivational integration of behaviour in the social structure can take place. „This integration of a set of common value patterns with the internalized need-disposition structure of the constituent personalities is the core phenomenon of the dynamics of social systems,“ Parsons insisted. The lack of appreciation of this factor in rational choice theory and other social models based on economic theory was in his view a key weakness of these theories. By focussing almost exclusively on *interest* as the motivational factor in social action and ignoring the normative aspect, models of economic rationality were in his view unable to give an adequate and dynamic analysis of social systems in general terms (Parsons 1952: 42)<sup>5</sup>.

*False consciousness.* *The social system* did include discussions of conflicts and norm deviation but Parsons' theory was nevertheless generally interpreted as a conservative understanding of society as a basically stable and harmonious entity. The deep-rooted sense of common affiliations and allegiances among its members makes it possible to absorb and transform dissent and conflict and prevent abrupt upheavals.<sup>6</sup> „The virtual identification by normative functionalists of social order itself with consensus on norms and values excluded social conflict“, maintains one of Parsons' critics (Wrong 1994: 205). Normative func-

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<sup>4</sup> Emphasis in the original.

<sup>5</sup> Rational choice theorists sometimes refer to „values“ and „value-systems“ to explain human behaviour, but to them value usually means something very different from what Parsons and other normative functionalists had in mind. Usually their use of this term corresponds to the „goal“ or „aim“ of the action in functionalist terminology. See e.g. Schelling Th. C. (1995 [1960]) *The Strategy of Conflict*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

<sup>6</sup> It has been pointed out that this model fitted well with post-war American society but made less sense to European intellectuals who had experienced a series of dramatic social convulsions in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Wrong D. H. (1994) *The problem of order: What unites and what divides society*. New York: The Free Press. p. 205.

tionism was therefore rejected by political radicals who saw social conflict as the driving motor of society. As Marxism increasingly captured the minds of intellectuals in Europe and the closely related „conflict theory“ gained ground in American academia in the 1960s and 1970s, Parsonian functionalism was relegated to the sidelines of sociological debates.

Marxists denied that there was a community of values among all social groups in society. The basic units of society are those related to the means of production, the economic classes. Workers, peasants, and the bourgeoisie have radically different, indeed antagonistic interests, and also different value systems. At the same time, most Marxists conceded that the values, norms, and moral codes of the various classes often are not quite as different from each other as their antagonistic class interests might indicate. The reason for this, they explained, is that all classes in society are engulfed in „false consciousness“: In normal times the upper class manages to impose its world view upon society at large (Marcuse 1991 [1964]). Karl Marx expressed it this way: „The ideas of the ruling class are, in every age, the ruling ideas.“ By extension, the ruling values in society are also those of the ruling class. This point was taken up and elaborated by interwar Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci into his concept of political-cultural hegemonism, a concept that made a strong impact on Marxist debates in the post-war generation. Marxists, then, regarded it as a necessary precondition for social revolution to liberate the subjugated classes from their mental captivity and make them rediscover not only their true class interests but also their true values.

In a brilliant article from 1970, Michael Mann launched a broadside against normative functionalism and adduced four major objections to the statement that shared values integrate and legitimate social structures:

- 1 „Most general values, norms and social beliefs usually mentioned as integrating societies are extremely vague, and can be used to legitimate any social structure, existing or not.“ As an example, Mann pointed to the fact that medieval rebels habitually appealed to the same common Christian values as did the defenders of the established hierarchical European society at the time.
- 2 „Even if a value is stated precisely, it may lead to conflict, not cohesion. For while some values unite men, others necessarily divide them.“ As evidence of this Mann referred to the values of suspiciousness and treachery found among some tribal peoples. A high degree of consensus about *such* values will inevitably increase conflict in society, he pointed out.
- 3 „The standards embodied in values are absolute ones, and it is difficult for such absolutes to co-exist without conflict“. For instance, the modern Western values of achievement and equality each limits the scope of the other.

- 4 Precisely since values often run at cross purposes, societies often develop ways to „insulate“ them from each other. „For example, in a society which values achievement, a lower class is more likely to acquiesce in its inequality if it places less stress on achievement than on other values“. In such a situation social cohesion may say to stem from the *lack of common commitment* to the same core values. (Mann 1970: 424)

Mann did not rule out that a given society in actual fact can be characterized by a high degree of common values among various classes and social groups. Whether or not this is the case was in his view an empirical question.

*Communitarianism.* There can be no doubt that the value consensus in Western societies, to the degree that it really existed in the immediate post-World War II period, slowly disintegrated towards the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. This was hardly the result of a rediscovery of the class identities that Marxists hoped for; indeed, class identities in European societies rapidly eroded during the same period. Instead, value fragmentation followed in the wake of market capitalism. The understanding of the individual as primarily a citizen was replaced by the individual as a consumer with few responsibilities towards society at large. Affluence bred a „permissive society“ with increasing relativism and value pluralism. This, in any case, was the situation as diagnosed by a score of concerned politicians and social activists who felt that their exhortations to the public to contribute to the common weal fell on deaf ears (Etniozi 1968). In the 1980s, their frustration gave rise to a new political agenda called „communitarianism“.

Communitarianism is a rather loose program and does not constitute a political movement in any organized sense. Even so, attempts have been made to formulate a systematized communitarian creed. Central to this creed is the need to rediscover „common values“. The emphasis in this expression falls on both „common“ and „values“, in contrast to both individualism, on the one hand, and a one-sided preoccupation with interests, on the other. Communitarians believe that „any political system which insists that only individuals' self-interested calculations matter in public decisions must be impoverished“ (Tam 1998: 26). Not only are common values necessary, but there also exist objective ways to discover which ones communities ought to live by, communitarians maintain.

According to Henry Tam, the Chair of the UK Communitarian Forum, three communitarian principles may be identified: co-operative enquiry, citizen participation, and mutual responsibility. Explaining the latter principle, he writes that

The communitarian principle of mutual responsibility requires all members of any community to take responsibility for enabling each other to pursue com-

mon values. Unlike relativists, who think that people's values are so different that there is no sense in talking about common values, communitarians believe that certain types of values have stood the test of time across different cultural variations (Tam 1998: 14).

## The role of common values in ethnically divided societies

Even if we grant that human collectivities are kept together by adherence to a common set of values among their members, this does not necessarily mean that shared values in all cases will function as a basis for nation-state consolidation. In those cases where the population of a given state is made up of a plurality of various ethnic groups, the effect may be the opposite: strong group values at a sub-state level may impede state consolidation. This, at least, is the conclusion drawn by several influential social scientists. Thus, for instance, Philip Jacob has maintained that:

The cohesion of a community seems to depend very fundamentally upon the compatibility of the values of its members. Indeed, one might almost say that it is a condition of community, that the human beings who compose it share values with each other more widely and more profoundly than they differ in their interests or struggle over competitive desires (Jacob 1964: 209-10).

This to a large extent reiterates Parsons' position. Much more clearly than Parsons, however, Jacob recognized that a high degree of value cohesion in sub-national communities may complicate social integration at the national level. He distinguished between intra-community and inter-community integration and believed that integration at these two levels may often be at cross-purposes: „We confront a paradox: The more viable the separate communities, in the sense that they are united on their goals and responsive to similar values, the more difficult it will be to find solutions which incorporate them or relate them effectively to their neighbors“ (Jacob 1964: 243-244). The community that is strongly committed to its social values may have great difficulty cooperating with others and will be a recalcitrant minority in a broader community where its values are not fully influential, Jacob believed.

Various answers have been given to Jacob's „paradox“. Karl Deutsch, one of the captains of post-war American sociology, believed that smaller cultural groups will always tend to assimilate into the dominant culture in the region in which they live. In the pre-modern world, small linguistic or cultural groups may well hold on to their separate identity for centuries within larger alien cultural environments, but under modern conditions, in industrial and urban societies, Deutsch believed, these processes will proceed much faster.

Whenever members of this community come into contact with a dominant culture, they are typically confronted with another set of values. Some of the traditional values held by the group may resonate well with the values they find in the greater society, while others do not. In such a situation, Deutsch assumed that those traditional values that are easily adapted to the new circumstances will acquire a strong boost, while those that impede assimilation will tend to atrophy. „Where this cross-cultural pull to assimilation is reinforced by the intra-cultural balance among conflicting values, assimilation may be rapid and may bridge even apparently large differences“ (Deutsch 1966: 161).

Other researchers such as Walker Connor objected that the mechanisms of assimilation identified by Deutsch may perhaps work well in immigrant societies such as the United States, in which all citizens (with the exception of native Americans and Afro-Americans) have voluntarily left their home country in search of a new one and accepted the dominance of the already established language and overarching cultural code. The situation was entirely different, Connor believed, in societies composed of what he described as „distinct and self-differentiating cultures“ (Connor 1994 [1967]: 21). Such societies are typically found in states where the various constituent groups have deep historical roots and a specific territory which they feel attached to. This societal type was increasingly referred to as „plural“.

The term „plural societies“ was first introduced in social science literature in the 1940s by a British colonial administrator, J.S. Furnivall, who restricted its application to tropical and multi-racial societies in European colonies (Edelstein 1974: 46). In Furnivall's understanding, these subjugated societies lacked a common consensus and „social will“. Any unity they had was involuntary, imposed by the colonial power and by the force of economic circumstances. The union could therefore not be dissolved without the whole society relapsing into anarchy (Furnivall 1948: 307). Later theoreticians such as M.G. Smith and Leo Kuper generalized Furnivall's concept to include not only colonies but also other sharply segmented societies in which the social and cultural norms that govern members of the various segments are incompatible (Grillo 1998: 7). As summarized by Leo Kuper, the theory of plural societies held that

Integration rests on common values and common motivation at the individual level and on the functional relations of common institutions at the societal level. It presupposes cultural homogeneity. ... Cultural diversity or pluralism automatically imposes the strictest necessity for domination by one of the cultural sections. It excludes the possibility of consensus, or of institutional integration, or of structural balance between the different sections, and necessitates non-democratic regulation of group relationships. (Kuper 1969: 14)



The writings of Furnivall, Smith and Kuper gave rise to a lively debate. One critic of the plural society theory, L.E.S. Braithwaite, asserted that „there must be a certain minimum of common shared values if the unity of the society is to be maintained.“ (Braithwaite 1960: 822). In turn, this point of view was attacked by David Nicholls, who claimed that „recent empirical research ... casts doubt upon the existence of such a set of „common values“ even in Britain itself, though the Parsonical chorus continues to repeat the sacred words“ (Nicholls 1974: 46). The Dutch political scientist Arend Lijphart contended that even in the absence of common values it was quite possible to introduce democratic institutions and practices into plural societies, albeit perhaps not of the same liberal kind as in homogeneous Western societies. The basic idea of Lijphart’s consociational model of democracy for plural societies was that pragmatic cooperation between the political elites of the various cultural segments might overcome communal antagonisms (Lijphart 1977).

Paul R. Brass, an expert on Indian ethnopolitics, has launched a more fundamental criticism of the plural society theory that also affects Lijphart’s revised version. Brass contends that this theory treats ethnic and other cultural communities as unitary and given groups, in a way that prevents the observer from discerning important differences *within* each group. „Theories of the plural society, for example, cannot begin to explain why most Muslims in south India with similar Islamic values and institutions to those of Muslims in the north have more peaceful relations with Hindus on the whole than Muslims in the north...“ (Brass 1991: 277). Another expert on India, the Norwegian researcher Eldrid Mageli, takes Brass’ criticism one step further by maintaining that India, like many other culturally heterogeneous states, seems to hang together precisely *because* no-one tries to enforce any kind of common values on the population. „In order to survive as a state, India must continue to be pluralistic and value fragmented and allow for a number of different kinds and shapes of allegiance“ (Mageli 2000: 123). As soon as a political party with a homogenizing program comes to power and tries to impose on all groups the same set of values (in the Indian context this would most certainly mean some variety of political Hinduism), the country may well relapse into chaos or civil war, she believes.

*Multiculturalism.* Multiculturalism in many respects represents the very opposite of the school of communitarianism presented above. Multiculturalists relish cultural differences and do not see value disparity as a threat to social peace and stability. A leading proponent of the multiculturalist school, the Canadian scholar Will Kymlicka, maintains that far from being a one-to-one relationship between value systems and identities, there may in fact be a *reverse* relationship between value systems and ethnic/national identities in a population: When the former converge the latter will often drift apart. Under

modern conditions ethnic and national groups living in the same state will tend to acquire increasingly similar values, while at the same time they increasingly develop distinct identities. „Shared values are not sufficient for social unity. The fact that two national groups share the same values or principles of justice does not necessarily give them any strong reason to join (or remain) together, rather than remaining (or splitting into) two separate countries“, Kymlicka asserted (Kymlicka 1995: 188).

To underpin his view, Kymlicka points to the relationship between Anglophones and Francophones in his native Canada. Until the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the Francophone communities were rurally based and strongly attached to traditionalist Catholic values. This contrasted sharply with the much more liberal, urban, and secular ethos that dominated among the Anglophones. As a result of rapid social transformation after World War II, however, the Francophone communities were caught up in the whirlwind of urbanization and modernization. Concomitantly, its members increasingly acquired a worldview and value orientation that approached the Anglophone standard. But, and this is Kymlicka's main point, the post-war decades were also the period when the ideas of Francophone nationalism and Quebec separatism began to gain ground. Francophone nationalism, then, is not a function of Francophone cultural difference.<sup>7</sup>

As a counterexample, Kymlicka points to the situation in the United States. The American population is multiethnic, and many of the ethnic communities in that country do indeed adhere to value codes that differ from that of the dominant Wasp (White Anglo-Saxon Protestant) population. Even so, there are strong patriotic sentiments among virtually all cultural groups and no separatist movements.<sup>8</sup>

What accounts for this difference between the two North American states? Kymlicka dismisses all attempts to distinguish between different *kinds* of values, some of which may be more important for national unity than others. For instance, it would be quite wrong to claim that Quebec separatists want to secede because French Canadians adhere to different *political* values from English Canadians. Nationalists may well crave a separate state and at the same time want this new state to be based on the very same political values and principles as the one they secede from. And in actual fact, Francophone separatists do not normally want independent Quebec to be governed by different political principles from those of contemporary Canada, Kymlicka points out. The reason why some groups demand a separate political entity, then, Kymlicka

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<sup>7</sup> In addition Kymlicka points to the relationship between Sweden and Norway. There is a remarkable convergence of values among the peoples of these two neighbouring states, but this fact in itself does not give them any impetus to reunite and become citizens of the same state.

<sup>8</sup> On the American mainland at least. Puerto Rico may be an exception to the rule.

finds at the level of *identity*, as distinct from values and culture: Americans seem to have a *shared identity* as Americans that Canadians (and members of some other multicultural states such as Belgium) are lacking.

## Putin's program for value-based nation-building in Russia

In his public statements, President Putin has expressed concern about what he sees as the strong fragmentation of political forces in Russia and launched a nation-building program based on common Russian values to overcome the divisions in Russian society.

At the turn of the millennium, only hours before Boris Yeltsin stepped down in a surprise move, and Putin took over as acting president, he published a document on the internet that acquired, as it were, the status as his first rudimentary political program and his vision for Russia.<sup>9</sup> The president designate outlined a three-point strategy for the renewal and flourishing of his country: a strong state, an effective economy, and a Russian (*rossiiskaia*) idea. To be sure, Putin distanced himself from all attempts to enforce a new mandatory ideology on Russian society. Russia should have no officially sanctioned and state-supported ideology, he maintained, since that would leave no space for intellectual or spiritual liberty, pluralism of ideas, or freedom of expression. At the same time, „in a society driven by such schisms and fragmentations of political forces as we are currently experiencing, it is impossible to carry out the fruitful and edifying work that our Fatherland so sorely needs.“ The fact that basic social strata and political forces in Russia adhere to „different basic values and fundamental ideological principles“, was a cause for great concern. A new national consensus had to be found. In contradistinction to the official Communist ideology, however, it should be voluntary and build on the unconstrained response of the population.

How could the future Russian identity be both voluntary and common at the same time? The answer in Putin's view would be to build on the aims and values that the vast majority of Russia's citizens already adhere to and find attractive. Among Russian values as they are reflected in contemporary Russian society, Putin made a distinction between two main strands. On the one hand are universal, pan-human values.

A process has started in which our people has begun to accept and adopt supranational, pan-human values, elevated above the interests of particular social

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<sup>9</sup> Putin V. V.: 'Rossiia na rubezhe tysyachetletii'. Available at: the website of the Government of the Russian Federation, [<http://www.government.gov.ru/government/minister/article-vvp1.html>]

and ethnic groups. People have adopted such values as the freedom of expression, the right to leave the country, and other political rights and personal liberties. People value the fact that they can own their own property, engage in business, and create a fortune for themselves. And this list could be continued.

While Putin characterized these values as universal and „pan-human“, they could perhaps more aptly be described as values normally associated with Western-style capitalism and liberal democracy. By ascribing these values to today’s Russians, the acting president seemed to say that the basic tendency of the political and economic program of his predecessor had been accepted by the majority of the country’s population.

Alongside this cluster of universal, or Western, values, another set of values also continues to inform the Russian mindset and Russian morals, Putin asserted. These are „primordial (*iskonnnye*), traditional Russian values“. Not all of them are included, only those that have stood the test of time: patriotism, *derzhavnost’* („great-power-ness“), *gosudarstvennichestvo* (state-centredness), and social solidarity. While *derzhavnost’* expresses the view that Russia ought to play an important role in world affairs, *gosudarstvennichestvo* indicates that the Russian state ought to play a pivotal role in Russian society.

To the Russian, a strong state is not an anomaly. It is not something one should try to combat. On the contrary, a strong state is a source and guarantor of order. It is the initiator and main driving force of all transformations. Contemporary Russian society does not equate a strong and effective state with a totalitarian state. We have learnt to appreciate the blessings of democracy and law-governed state, private liberty and political liberty. At the same time, people are worried about the manifest weakening of state power. The public wants to see the reestablishment of the guiding and regulating role of the state, to such a degree that this is necessary, on the basis of the country’s traditions and taking into account the contemporary situation.

Finally, Putin identified *social solidarity* as a central and typically Russian value not shared by all of humankind.

It is a fact that in Russia the tendency towards collective forms of activity has always dominated over individualism. It is also a fact that in Russian society paternalistic sentiments are deeply embedded. The majority of Russians are used to associating a betterment of their lot not so much with their own efforts, initiative, and enterprise as with the help and support of the state and society. This habit dies very hard.

According to Putin, the universal and specifically Russian values in the Russian population do not contradict each other. It is possible and indeed also necessary to reconcile and combine these two strands in the Russian value

set. This process must be allowed to develop by its own course and speed, Putin maintained. It should not be artificially speeded up, nor retarded.

How did Putin know that the values he listed were indeed the values Russians live by? To be sure, his list was not extraordinary in any way. It consisted for the most part of the same stereotype assertions that most popular histories of Russia abound in, but that in itself did not make it any more reliable. The question of whether or not contemporary Russian society is marked by value cohesion or value fragmentation is of course an empirical question. If an important pool of common values in the Russian population really exists, this may be established through scrupulous sociological research and large scale population surveys. As a former KGB officer, Putin may well have access to such data, but if he does, he did not reveal his sources. He went straight to the conclusion and presented a list of putative values that allegedly dominate among the contemporary Russian public. The value-oriented identity-building program of Vladimir Putin therefore seems, after all, strangely reminiscent of earlier top-down state-ideology constructions.

## An empirical investigation of value cohesion and common identity in Russia

Our research project may in a sense be regarded as an unsolicited attempt to test the empirical basis of President Putin's nation-building program. In 2000 we ran a large scale survey (1200 respondents) in Russia, specifically designed to map the value orientations of the Russian population. Some of the questions were formulated as much as possible in the same vocabulary as was used by the Russian president. In addition, we wanted to find out to what degree the values we found to be prevalent in the Russian population were evenly or unevenly distributed among the various regions and various social and ethnic groups in the population. For that purpose we chose six regions with different characteristics as survey points: Moscow; St. Petersburg, Novosibirsk, Komi, Bashkortostan, and Dagestan. Within each of these regions the value orientations of various cultural, ethnic, and social groups were compared. As a next step, the aggregate data from each region were compared with data from the other regions. The survey results allowed us to compose a multifaceted mosaic of contemporary Russian values.

By focusing on six of Russia's eighty-nine regions, we cannot pretend to have covered it all. It can justifiably be claimed that many of the regions that have been left out have characteristics that are not adequately represented in our sample. While realizing that this is inevitable, we made a conscious choice to include regions that typify some features that were politically salient and have a direct bearing on nation-building. For this reason, the twenty-one re-

publics of the Russian Federation were clearly overrepresented in our sample, with three of six survey regions. The rules of the game in Russian nation-building politics after Communism have clearly favoured the ethnically based republics, giving them a number of levers in their relations with central authorities that the other Subjects of the Federation are lacking. The outcome of Russian nation-building, therefore, to a very large extent depends on developments in the republics. The three republics we chose represent both different regions and exhibit rather different political characteristics: Komi (an ethnically defined, but politically non-assertive republic in the North with a basically industrial economy); Bashkortostan (a politically assertive ethnically defined republic in the Volga-Ural region with a mixed rural-urban economy); and finally Dagestan (a multinational republic in the Caucasus with a rural economy).

Our questionnaire contained background information about our respondents with regard to age, sex, marital status, number of children, income bracket, and level of education. In the presentations below we have made a conscious choice to focus on variations along two parameters, ethnicity and regional differences. The reason for this is the framework of nation-building within which we were conducting our research: only ethnicity and territory, in our view, have the potential to function as rival foci of nation-building that may compete with an all-Russian nation-building project, and impede the consolidation of Russia as a nation-state. While class has been a crucial political parameter in the past – the October revolution was carried out under the banners of a class ideology – in today's Russia class identification seems to be a spent force, cf. the extreme weakness of Russian labour unions. But even more importantly, *even if* unions or class-based parties had been vibrant political forces in Russia, mobilization along class divisions does not threaten the unity of the state.<sup>10</sup>

One way to assess the level of national cohesion could be to measure the ratio of value differences along ethnic and territorial parameters to value differences along social parameters. If social differences are more important than ethnic or territorial differences in explaining variations in value expressions, we have a high degree of national cohesion. Our survey allowed us to make such measurements. In order to get an overall picture of the value pattern in the Russian Federation, we had to first compute some combined measures, taking into account variation not only for one single variable but across several variables which are logically and empirically related to one another.

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<sup>10</sup> In Russian history the opposite has in fact been the case. As soon as they had consolidated their power in the Russian core area after the conclusion of the Russian civil war, the Bolsheviks reassembled as much as they could of the borderlands into the new Soviet state. In the course of time, they launched a project of Soviet nation-building aimed at the creation of a unified Soviet people, *Sovetskii narod*.

Running correspondence analysis for the twenty-one most important indicators of personal and political values (attitudes to religion, corruption, family, government priorities, what values to teach children, etc), we found that the value questions clearly made up two distinct dimensions, one which largely encompasses attitudes to individual freedom and the role of the government and the second covering issues of religion, corruption and family values. Based on the results of the correspondence analysis, we computed two indexes for personal and political values reflecting the most important value patterns found in the six regions of our study. We called the first index „Individualism,“ in which high values are associated with a focus on popular influence on everyday life and politics, freedom of speech, and preferences for a western style democratic regime, while persons with negative values tended to want stronger government intervention, request strong defence and crime fighting, and see a strong leader or army rule as good political systems.

We refer to the second index as „Morals.“ High values here indicate a focus on religion and family values, and rejection of corruption, abortion, and prostitution. Negative values are associated with acceptance of sexual freedom, acceptance of corruption in some situations, and disapproval of marriage and family values.<sup>11</sup> The Individualism index has values varying from -10 to 10, while the morals index varies from -10 to 12.

As it turned out, the responses on both indexes were quite normally distributed, with the majority scoring around zero. In spite of the indexes being constructed in a way that may encourage polarization (i.e. acceptance of abortion increasing negative values while opposition to abortion giving positive values), no respondent got the extreme values (see Figure 1). This indicates that there is little polarization in the Russian Federation when it comes to personal and political values. We cannot talk of two groups strictly opposing each other, but rather about a majority situated in the centre, and small groups at the extremes.

Our main point of interest in this study, however, was not the overall value patterns of the Russian Federation, but how these value patterns are reflected in systematic differences between regions and ethnic groups. Are the populations of the various regions evenly spread out along these dimensions as well? In Table 1 we have presented the mean scores of the indexes for the main ethnic groups and the six regions included in this survey.

Let us look at the Individualism index first. Not surprisingly, the cities of Moscow and St Petersburg stood out clearly as being the most individualistic, while Dagestan was quite far below the national average. If we look at the ethnic groups, we find that the Russians clearly differed from the others, and that there in fact was little difference between the nationalities of Dagestan

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<sup>11</sup> For a more thorough presentation of the indexes see *Kolstø and Blakkisrud 2004: 341–48*.

and the Bashkir population. It is interesting to note that Russians living in the three republics expressed less individualistic values than Russians in the oblasts and cities. We should remember, however, that two-thirds of those who belong to the latter category lived in the two major cities of Moscow and St Petersburg. In any case, the Russian population in the republics was still more individualistic than the ethnic groups with whom they live. In this way, the Russians in the republics occupied, as it were, a middle position between the non-Russians on the one hand and the Russians in Russian-dominated regions on the other. They seemed to be influenced both by the typical values of their own ethnic group and by the typical values of the region they live in.

On the Morals index Dagestan also distanced itself from the others, displaying clearly the most moralistic stands. However, it was not the major cities that were found at the other extreme, but the republic of Komi, with Moscow coming in only second. As we will see later, however, when other background variables are accounted for, the Komi population was not necessarily less moralistic than the population of Moscow. The populations of Novosibirsk and St Petersburg were more likely to express support for moral statements than the people of Komi and Bashkortostan. If we look at the results for ethnic groups, we find that there was little difference between Russians in Moscow, St Petersburg, and Novosibirsk on one hand, and Russians living in one of the three republics on the other hand. The titular population of Komi and Bashkortostan had on average one point less on the Morals scale, while the nationalities of Dagestan had on average two points *more* than the Russians.

As Table 2 illustrates, there were also clear differences in the degree of individualism between educational groups and in moral stands between urban and rural areas. The differences between age groups were marked for both. The regions included in this survey were very different with regard to the average educational level of the population, level of urbanization, and to some degree in demographic structure. In order to find out how much of the differences between regions and ethnic groups were due to ethnic or centre-periphery conflicts and how much can be explained with reference to generational or educational differences, we ran regression analyses with the two indexes as dependent variables (see Table 3).<sup>12</sup>

The most important factor by far in explaining differences in individualism was the educational level. People with higher education scored on average 1.5/1.6 points higher on the Individualism scale, irrespective of region and ethnicity. When other social background variables were accounted for, there

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<sup>12</sup> Due to strong colinearity, separate analyses had to be run to account for ethnicity and region. We included in the analysis indicators of education, sex, age, labour force status, and urbanization.



were no significant differences between the regions, with one exception—Dagestan. In this republic, the population scored on average 1 point less on the Individualism scale than did the population of Novosibirsk (control group). However, compared to the Russian population living outside the Russian-dominated areas, the nationalities of Dagestan were only somewhat less individualistic (0.6 points). The only other significant difference between ethnic groups that we found were between the Russian population in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Novosibirsk on one hand, and the Russians living in the three republics on the other hand. However, equally large differences were found between the retired/unemployed and the working population, people living in urban and rural areas, and the young and the old. In other words, social differences are more important than spatial or ethnic factors in explaining variation in individualism among our six regions.

On the Morals index there are clearer differences between regions and ethnic groups. The population of Dagestan stood out clearly with the strictest moral stands, with the population of Moscow and Komi at the other end of the scale. On attitudes to moral questions there were no significant differences between Russians in the republics on one hand, and Russians in oblasts and cities on the other hand. However, the ethnic Russians seemed to take a middle stand between the nationalities of Dagestan on one hand (which had an average score 2 points higher than the Russians), and the clearly less moralistic Bashkirs, Tatars, and Komis on the other hand. Each of the latter groups scored at least 1 point lower than the Russians. Still, age seemed to be the most important variable explaining differences in moral stands; persons in their twenties are predicted to score one and a half points lower than persons in their forties, and 3 points lower than persons in their sixties. There were also clear gender differences, with men taking somewhat less moralistic stands than women.

To sum up: the most important factors explaining differences in individualism in Russia in our survey were education, age, urbanization, and labour force status. Even when these factors are accounted for, however, Dagestanis were somewhat less individualistic and Russians in the oblasts and cities somewhat more individualistic than other groups. Ethnicity and region were more important for explaining differences in moral attitudes. However, in spite of Moscow standing out as the region with the lowest score on the Morals index, the Russians as a group ended up in the middle, between the Dagestanis on one hand and the Komis, Bashkirs, and Tatars on the other.

In no society will all members adhere to the same values. If a survey indicates close to a hundred percent support for a certain value, it simply means that the questionnaire was poorly formulated and focused on values with low analytical potential, such as „do you prefer goodness to evil?“ or „do you prefer wealth to poverty?“ What our survey shows, however, is that support for vari-

ous alternative values was more or less *evenly distributed* in Russian society along spatial and ethnic parameters.<sup>13</sup> The value pattern forms a continuum in which Moscow makes up the one end of the scale and Dagestan the other. Different levels of modernization in the various regions may explain much of the differences that exist between these poles. Variation is usually larger *within* each region than between regions. Therefore, „shared values“ is perhaps a more appropriate term than „common values.“ The situation is characterized by *overlapping* and *cross-cutting* value patterns among regions and ethnic groups, not identical value preferences across the board.

## Attitudes on nation-building: Common state and/or common nationhood

What are the implications of this for Russian nation-building? How important is ethnicity and territoriality in explaining the variation in political identities? Our survey included a number of questions concerning political identity formation and attitudes to federal relations. We ran correspondence analysis with 16 of the most important variables, and two distinct and independent dimensions emerged; on the one hand we got a function of *Rossiiskii*/regional identities, and on the other hand attitudes to centralization and regional self government. As in the section above, we computed two indexes containing the information found in the correspondence plot. The first index we called *Rossiiskii* identity, in which persons claimed that their motherland is Russia, were proud of being *rossiianin*, were willing to fight for Russia (but not for their oblast/republic), and had high positive values. High negative values are associated with people that identify first and foremost with their region or republic/oblast and define themselves as members of their ethnic group rather than as *rossiiane*.

The second index is called Centralization. Here, high positive values indicate support for a strong, unitary Russian state where taxes are collected and redistributed from the centre, support for *gosudarstvennichestvo* and patriotism as part of a state ideology, and rejection of regional independence and

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<sup>13</sup> This is the conclusion also drawn by Leokadia Drobizheva in a study of values among Russians and Tatars in the urban population of Tatarstan in 1993–1996. She found that when asked to select the most important preconditions for a happy life 77 percent of the Tatars and 74 percent of the Russians pointed to the family; exactly the same number in each group, 50.4 percent, mentioned a good job; 41.2 percent and 42.2 percent, respectively, pointed to the respect of other people; 64 percent and 67 percent—prosperity, and 23 percent and 23 percent—education. The differences between the responses of the two groups were so insignificant that we can confidently conclude that their values of hierarchies were identical (Drobizheva 1997: 44–63).

special rights. Negative values indicate support for a federation with strong regions that have the right to secede, to have different political systems and to make laws that contravene Russian state laws.

The Centralization index varies from -9 to 8, the Rossiiskii Identity index from -6 to 6. On the Centralization index there was even less variation than in the two previously discussed indexes on Morals and Individualism. The majority of the respondents displayed positive attitudes to centralization, according to the variables included in the index, with about two-thirds of the respondents scoring between zero and 3. On the negative end of the scale, the respondents were more spread out, but all in all, there was also little polarization on this index, indicating a rather homogenous population in attitudes to centralization. On the Rossiiskii Identity index, only 12 categories were included, and the index thus only varies from -6 to 6. The population was more spread out (relative to the number of values) than on the previously discussed indexes, but also here the majority scored positively, i.e. indicating a tendency towards Rossiiskii rather than regional identities.

The two indexes are statistically independent of one another. This means that there is no systematic co-variation between Russian identity and attitudes to federal organisation (coefficients are close to zero and not significant in a bivariate regression analysis). Thus, in order to understand the variation in attitudes to the central government, we have to look at indicators other than overall identification with the Russian nation-state. This can also be taken to indicate that strong regional identities do not necessarily lead to centrifugal attitudes or a pursuit of regional self-government.

Not surprisingly, the strongest regional identification was found in the three republics, while the Russian areas, Novosibirsk oblast, and the two cities were more likely to express *Rossiiskii* identities. The strongest regional identities by far were found in Dagestan. *In this republic, however, we also found the strongest support for strong central government and limited regional self rule.* In Bashkortostan, and in particular among the ethnic Bashkir population, we find both strong regional identities and quite strong support for regional independence. In the Komi titular population, we found relatively weak regional ties.

Turning to the results of the regression analyses (see Table 4), we are able to identify the controlled, direct effects of ethnicity and other relevant factors on identity and attitudes to central government. If we look at *Rossiiskii* identification, we find that there were large and significant differences between Russians living outside the Russian dominated areas and all other ethnic groups, with the Dagestanis displaying the weakest *Rossiiskii* identity (on average 2.3 points lower than Russians in republics). Russians living in Russian-dominated areas displayed the highest *Rossiiskii* identification (on average 0.7 points higher than Russians in republics). Taking into account the limited variation on this index (two-thirds scoring between 0 and 3), these differences are large. In fact, ethnicity alone

explained 23 percent of the variation in *Rossiiskii* identification in our sample. Social background variables such as age, education, and labour market status had no influence on identity formation at all.

There were significant differences between ethnic groups regarding attitudes to centralization as well, although the differences were not as marked as those found for *Rossiiskii* identity. Also, as already noted, the ethnic Russians (no significant difference between those living in Russian dominated areas and those living outside) occupied a middle position, with the Dagestanis clearly taking a more pro-centralization stand and the Komis, and in particular the Tatars and Bashkirs, taking a somewhat more anti-centralization stand. Here age, education, and gender also played significant roles in influencing attitudes. When all is said and done, however, ethnicity and social background variables were only able to explain 10 percent of the variation in attitudes to centralization. This means that other, non-observed or random influences were of greater importance.

## Some Conclusions

As we mentioned above, Will Kymlicka claims that „Shared values are not sufficient for social unity. The fact that two national groups share the same values or principles of justice does not necessarily give them any strong reason to join (or remain) together, rather than remaining (or splitting into) two separate countries.“ How does Russia conform to Kymlicka’s scheme? As our survey shows, the various ethnic groups in Russia do indeed to a large extent share the same value preferences in their private lives. Ethnicity and regional affiliation do not play important roles in explaining the variation in value orientations for their private values. At the same time, we found that non-Russians and Russians have very different scores on the *Rossiiskii* index, *but not on the Centralization index*. This indicates that although the non-Russians do have different political identities, i.e. attached to local and regional communities, than the dominant Russian group, these separate identities do *not* lead to separatist aspirations. Thus, to the extent that republican political leaders have tried to exploit the distinct regional identities of their local population to enhance their own power and weaken the centralized state, they have done so without the backing of their constituencies. The Russian case, then, is ambiguous: it partly confirms, partly runs counter to Kymlicka’s dictum. Like in Canada, the population in Russia has indeed a number of distinct, localized political identities, but these identities, *pace* Kymlicka, cannot be readily exploited as springboards for separatism.

While on the basis of his Canadian observations, Kymlicka draws the conclusion that shared values are not a sufficient basis for a viable nation-state,

they do not allow him to say anything about whether or not common values are *necessary* for a viable nation-state. His US example seemingly allows him to conclude that common values are indeed unnecessary for a viable nation-state, but he does not provide any hard data about value differences in the American population. In our view, more evidence of ethnic value patterns in the United States (or any other states with weak or absent centrifugal nation-building) is needed before his conclusion can be substantiated on this point. Personal impression and anecdotal evidence would suggest that the vast majority of new immigrants to the United States in fact do share such basic value priorities as placing achievement above equality and liberty above social security, preferences that distinguish American society from, for instance, most European societies.<sup>14</sup>

At this point, however, our study may perhaps come to Kymlicka's rescue. The region in our study that exhibits the greatest degree of distinct, separate values on the Individualism and Morals indexes—Dagestan—was at the same time the republic in which there is the *least* pressure for political separatism. While this may well be explained in terms of economic prudence—you don't bite the hand that feeds you—it seems to provide us with a clear example of a region that combines centrifugal value orientation with centripetal political orientation.

Putin's claim that there exists a common pool of „Rossiiskie“ values was then more or less confirmed by our study. His assumption, however, that the existence of such value consensus is necessary in order to prop up support in the population for the Russian state was not supported.

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<sup>14</sup> The involuntary immigrants, the Afro-Americans, as well as the indigenous populations, the native Americans and Mexicans along the Texas/New Mexico border may be exceptions.

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## Figures and tables

FIGURE 1. Indexes of individualism and morals, univariate distributions




FIGURE 2. Indexes of Centralisation and Rossiiskii Identity, univariate distributions




TABLE 1. Mean scores on indexes of Individualism and Morals, by region and ethnic groups

|                     |                                | Individualism |        | Morals     |        | N      |
|---------------------|--------------------------------|---------------|--------|------------|--------|--------|
|                     |                                | Mean score    | St dev | Mean score | St dev |        |
| <b>Overall mean</b> |                                | -0.12         | 2.9    | -0.36      | 3.5    | 1200   |
| <b>Region</b>       | St Petersburg                  | 0.66          | 2.8    | -0.33      | 3.7    | 200.00 |
|                     | Moscow                         | 0.62          | 3.0    | -1.03      | 3.4    | 200.00 |
|                     | Republic Komi                  | -0.20         | 2.6    | -1.22      | 3.4    | 200.00 |
|                     | Novosibirsk oblast             | -0.21         | 2.7    | -0.22      | 3.5    | 200.00 |
|                     | Republic Bashkortostan         | -0.54         | 3.0    | -0.69      | 3.3    | 200.00 |
|                     | Republic Dagestan              | -1.11         | 2.9    | 1.33       | 3.3    | 200.00 |
| <b>Ethnic group</b> | Russians in oblasts and cities | 0.35          | 2.9    | -0.56      | 3.5    | 569.00 |
|                     | Russians in republics          | -0.28         | 2.6    | -0.55      | 3.4    | 254.00 |
|                     | Komi                           | -0.72         | 2.6    | -1.70      | 3.2    | 56.00  |
|                     | Tatar                          | -0.93         | 3.8    | -1.05      | 3.1    | 41.00  |
|                     | Bashkir                        | -1.00         | 2.9    | -1.54      | 3.4    | 54.00  |
|                     | Nationalities of Dagestan      | -1.10         | 2.9    | 1.58       | 3.2    | 163.00 |
|                     | Other                          | 0.26          | 2.3    | -0.04      | 3.6    | 57.00  |

TABLE 2. Mean scores on indexes of Individualism and Morals, by educational level, age and urbanization

|              |                       | Individualism | Morals     | N      |
|--------------|-----------------------|---------------|------------|--------|
|              |                       | Mean score    | Mean score |        |
| Overall mean | -0.12                 | -0.36         | 1200       |        |
| Education    | Primary or less       | -1.50         | 0,57       | 193.00 |
|              | Secondary             | -0.29         | -0,51      | 374.00 |
|              | Specialized secondary | 0,09          | -0,46      | 444.00 |
|              | Higher (university)   | 1,08          | -0,77      | 189.00 |
| Age          | 29 and younger        | 0,58          | -1,81      | 281.00 |
|              | 30 thru 40            | 0,23          | -0,86      | 291.00 |
|              | 41 thru 60            | -0,22         | 0,13       | 393.00 |
|              | 60 and older          | -1,28         | 1,17       | 235.00 |
| Urban-Rural  | Urban                 | 0.18          | -0.47      | 912.00 |
|              | Rural                 | 1.10          | -0.01      | 288.00 |

TABLE 3. Regression analysis: Individualism and morals

|                              |   | INDEX I:<br>Individualism |                        | INDEX II:<br>Moral   |                        |
|------------------------------|---|---------------------------|------------------------|----------------------|------------------------|
|                              |   | Model 1<br>(regions)      | Model 2<br>(ethnicity) | Model 1<br>(regions) | Model 2<br>(ethnicity) |
|                              |   | B                         | B                      | B                    | B                      |
| <b>REGION</b>                |   |                           |                        |                      |                        |
| (vs. Novosibirsk)            | Moscow  | .44                       |                        | -1.00**              |                        |
|                              | St Petersburg                                 | .46                       |                        | -.29                 |                        |
|                              | Komi Republic                                 | -.20                      |                        | -.81**               |                        |
|                              | Republic of Bashkortostan                     | -.34                      |                        | -.42                 |                        |
|                              | Republic of Dagestan                          | -1.01**                   |                        | 1.94**               |                        |
| <b>ETHNICITY</b>             |   |                           |                        |                      |                        |
| <b>- self identification</b> |   |                           |                        |                      |                        |
| (vs. Russian in republics)   | Russians in oblasts and cities                |                           | .62**                  |                      | -.33                   |
|                              | Komi  |                           | .12                    |                      | -1.42**                |
|                              | Tartar  |                           | -.20                   |                      | -1.00*                 |
|                              | Bashkir                                       |                           | -.31                   |                      | -1.14*                 |
|                              | Nationalities of Dagestan                     |                           | -.62*                  |                      | 2.23**                 |
|                              | Other   |                           | .40                    |                      | .40                    |
| <b>EDUCATION</b>             |   |                           |                        |                      |                        |
| (vs. primary or less)        | Higher education                              | 1.49**                    | 1.58**                 | -.16                 | -.24                   |
|                              | Secondary education                           | .48*                      | .51*                   | .21                  | .17                    |
| <b>EMPLOYMENT</b>            |   |                           |                        |                      |                        |
| (vs. employed)               | Unemployed                                    | -.62*                     | -.62*                  | -.62                 | -.51                   |
|                              | Retired                                       | -.61*                     | -.62*                  | -.53                 | -.42                   |
| <b>AGE</b>                   |   |                           |                        |                      |                        |
|                              | Age in completed years                        | -.03**                    | -.03**                 | .08**                | .08**                  |
| <b>SEX</b>                   |   |                           |                        |                      |                        |
|                              | Men (vs. women)                               | -.07                      | -.07                   | -.57**               | -.58**                 |
| <b>POVERTY</b>               |   |                           |                        |                      |                        |
|                              | Economic situation below average (subjective) | -.05                      | -.07                   | .18                  | .27                    |
| <b>URBAN-RURAL</b>           |   |                           |                        |                      |                        |
|                              | Live in urban area (vs. Rural)                | .53**                     | .60**                  | .25                  | -.03                   |
|                              | (Constant)                                    | .39                       | -.12                   | -3.61                | -3.48                  |
|                              | R square (adjusted)                           | .14                       | .13                    | .17                  | .17                    |

\* significant on a 0.5 percent level; \*\* significant on a 0.01 percent level



TABLE 4. Mean scores on indexes of Rossiiskii Identities and Centralization, by region and ethnic groups

|           |                               | Rossiiskii Identity | Centralization |
|-----------|-------------------------------|---------------------|----------------|
| Total     |                               | 0.81                | 1.07           |
| Region    | St Petersburg                 | 1.68                | 1.25           |
|           | Novosibirsk oblast            | 1.63                | 0.91           |
|           | Moscow                        | 1.54                | 1.25           |
|           | Republic Komi                 | 0.80                | 0.53           |
|           | Republic Bashkortostan        | 0.13                | 0.22           |
|           | Republic Dagestan             | -0.96               | 2.24           |
| Ethnicity | Russian in cities and oblasts | 1.66                | 1.14           |
|           | Russian in republics          | 0.99                | 0.95           |
|           | Tatar                         | -0.68               | -0.18          |
|           | Bashkir                       | -0.90               | -0.88          |
|           | Komi                          | -0.11               | 0.30           |
|           | Nationalities of Dagestan     | -1.19               | 2.19           |
|           | Others                        | 0.51                | 1.02           |

TABLE 5. OLS Regression. Index on Rossiiskii identification and attitudes to centralization

|                              |   | INDEX III:<br>Rossiiskii Identity |                        | INDEX IV:<br>Centralization |                        |
|------------------------------|---|-----------------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------------|------------------------|
|                              |   | Model 1<br>(regions)              | Model 2<br>(ethnicity) | Model 1<br>(regions)        | Model 2<br>(ethnicity) |
| <b>REGION</b>                |   |                                   |                        |                             |                        |
| (vs. Novosibirsk)            | Moscow  | -0.24                             |                        | .20                         |                        |
|                              | St Petersburg                                 | -0.08                             |                        | .21                         |                        |
|                              | Komi Republic                                 | -0.81**                           |                        | -.36                        |                        |
|                              | Republic of Bashkortostan                     | -1.44**                           |                        | -.71**                      |                        |
|                              | Republic of Dagestan                          | -2.37**                           |                        | 1.41**                      |                        |
| <b>ETHNICITY</b>             |   |                                   |                        |                             |                        |
| <b>– self identification</b> |   |                                   |                        |                             |                        |
| (vs. Russians in republics)  | Russians in cities and oblasts                |                                   | 0.61**                 |                             | .10                    |
|                              | Komi  |                                   | -1.02**                |                             | -.72*                  |
|                              | Tartar  |                                   | -1.66**                |                             | -1.27**                |
|                              | Bashkir                                       |                                   | -1.85**                |                             | -1.91**                |
|                              | Nationalities of Dagestan                     |                                   | -2.07**                |                             | 1.23**                 |
|                              | Other   |                                   | -0.53                  |                             | -.05                   |
| <b>EDUCATION</b>             |   |                                   |                        |                             |                        |
| (vs. primary or less)        | Higher education                              | -0.08                             | -0.06                  | .49                         | .58*                   |
|                              | Secondary education                           | 0.06                              | 0.05                   | .48*                        | .51*                   |
| <b>EMPLOYMENT</b>            |   |                                   |                        |                             |                        |
| (vs. employed)               | Unemployed                                    | 0.26                              | 0.28                   | -.23                        | -.14                   |
|                              | Retired                                       | 0.00                              | -0.01                  | -.36                        | -.38                   |
| <b>AGE</b>                   | Age in completed years                        | 0.01                              | 0.01                   | .03**                       | .03**                  |
| <b>SEX</b>                   | Men (vs. women)                               | 0.01                              | 0.03                   | .34**                       | .34**                  |
| <b>POVERTY</b>               |   |                                   |                        |                             |                        |
|                              | Economic situation below average (subjective) | -0.06                             | -0.05                  | -.05                        | .01                    |
| <b>URBAN-RURAL</b>           | Live in urban area (vs. Rural)                | 0.60**                            | 0.26                   | .05                         | -.13                   |
|                              | (Constant)                                    | 0.88                              | 0.61                   | -.99                        | -.90                   |
|                              | R square (adjusted)                           | .19                               | .23                    | .10                         | .10                    |

## Bendros vertybės ir socialinė sanglauda etniškai padalytose visuomenėse

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**SANTRAUKA.** Straipsnyje nagrinėjamas klausimas apie žmonių bendruomenių integralumą etniškai padalytose visuomenėse, klausiant, kas lemia visuomenių sanglaudą. Autoriai pateikia pagrindinių Vakarų sociologijos teorijų (pvz., normatyvinis funkcionalizmas, racionalaus pasirinkimo teorijos, komunitarizmas, daugiakultūriškumas ir kt.), analizuojančių vertybių vaidmenį visuomenėse, ypatingą dėmesį skiriant daugiaetninėms visuomenėms, apžvalgą bei pateikia pagrindinius Rusijos Federacijos vertybėmis grįsto valstybės kūrimo metmenis. Atliktame empiriniame tyrime, kuris nagrinėja vertybių sanglaudą ir bendrą identitetą šešiuose Rusijos regionuose (Maskvoje, Sankt Peterburge, Novosibirske, Komi, Baškirijos ir Dagestano respublikose), siekiama empiriškai patikrinti prezidento V. Putino valstybės kūrimo programą. Studijos duomenys patvirtina bendrą „rossiiskie“ vertybių egzistavimą, kurios skirtingai išsidėlioja atskiruose regionuose ir tarp atskirų etninių grupių. Kiekviename regione buvo lyginamos įvairių kultūrinių, etninių ir socialinių grupių vertybinės orientacijos, o tyrimo rezultatai leido sudaryti daugiaaspektę šiuolaikinės Rusijos vertybių mozaiką.