

The Identity Dynamics of the Estonians and the Russians Living in Estonia Before and After the EU Referendum

Aksel Kirch, Mait Talts, Tarmo Tuisk

INSTITUTE FOR EUROPEAN STUDIES, AUDENTES UNIVERSITY, ESTONIA

ABSTRACT. In this article, the analysts of the Institute for European Studies (Estonia) examine the attitudes of the urban population in Estonia towards accession to the European Union, based on empirical data from the cities of Tallinn, Tartu, Viljandi, and Narva (N=235 persons). Data were gathered during the European Union enlargement process in Estonia in the end of 2002 and in April–June 2003, some months before the EU referendum held on 14 September 2003. The *Identity Structure Analysis (ISA)*, elaborated by Prof. P. Weinreich (University of Ulster) for research of the personal structure of identity, has been applied. Some basic factors that influenced the attitudes of residents of Estonia in the EU accession phase in 2002–2003 have been determined. The most important finding is their positive attitude towards Estonia's accession accompanied by the aspiration towards the European values and together with following European cultural tradition. The new international context gives new opportunities for local ethno-national integration. During the debate, which took place immediately before Estonia joined the EU, the majority of the citizens realised that EU membership does not mean the unconditional loss of Estonia's national identity, but provides new possibilities to define the country's position on Europe's geopolitical and cultural map instead.

Keywords: TRANSFORMATION, EU ENLARGEMENT PROCESS, EUROPEAN IDENTITY, PERSONAL IDENTITY DYNAMICS OF ESTONIANS AND RUSSIANS IN ESTONIA.

Introduction: visions of societal integration

Today Estonian population can be described as relatively diverse by several indicators: by ethnic background (Estonians, Russians, Ukrainians, Finns, etc), by language use (mainly Estonian or Russian), by income differences (Gini index = 0,37), by citizenship (more than 86 thousand permanent residents are Russian citizens), by political preferences (six parties are represented in the Parliament). How can we now characterise the situation – has the social, political, and cultural divergence made the society more fragmented, introducing more disintegration into society? Even if so, this can also be described as new circumstances for the development of democracy evolving new challenge for social integration of the society on a new level. The process of social integration can be analysed also from the aspect of reforming a common national identity of Estonian people (Estonians, Russians, Finns and other groups).

In the post-communist countries the construction of democracy inevitably means the use of political instruments for integrating ethnic elements into new systems, making special provisions for ethnic minorities. Since 1988–1989 the national identity of Estonian people has been mainly concentrated on the basis of an ethnic-cultural dimension (common language, common culture and traditions, common ancestry). In the early period of the newly independent state, when the attributes of the state were weak, the main essence of the identity of people was accepted as an ethnic and cultural (very often only lingual) one. The civic-political-economic dimension (common political and legal system, national economy, common system of social security, etc.) was subordinated compared to the ethnic cultural dimension (Kirch, Kirch 2001: 134).

By joining the European Union Estonia will doubtlessly become a member of one of the world's most homogeneous communities in the terms of economic policy. In addition to the influence on economic, legal, and political issues, the enlargement has also great impact on the cultural self-determination of the Estonians. This step will provide the opportunity to re-define our "Europeanness" from the viewpoint of a new European identity architecture. At the same time, it is quite sure that this does not mean the loss of specific cultural features or the rise of totally uniform European culture.

During about a dozen years of existence of the (newly) independent Estonian state, the importance of a mainly ethnic dimension in people's self-definition diminished and the social-political dimension increased at the same time. Developing democracy and state structures during the past twelve years have changed the circumstances. We can follow a process where the ethnic dimension for all people – Estonians and ethnic minorities – has lost the prevailing position and the civic dimension is becoming uppermost in people's perception of their identity.

In the predominant sociological literature, societal integration is considered to be the best developmental model for societies in central and eastern European countries (and in Estonia) as suggested by Münch (1993) and Löfgren and Herd (2000). Since the Estonian national reawakening of 1988, Russians and other Russian speaking minorities in Estonia have faced an almost existential question: who they are in Estonian society, what their place is, what role they have in societal integration, and whether they should become citizens of the restored republic. The authors conceived integration as a process of societal co-operation aimed at forging a new community of people at a higher qualitative level. In an integrated Estonian society, we envision all Estonian people with different ethnic backgrounds living and working in different structures and spheres of the society, while enjoying full and equal rights and responsibilities. It is extremely important in this context to distinguish integration from assimilation and segregation since, on one hand, it is important for the Russian minority to maintain its original cultural background, and, on the other hand, it is important for society as a whole that its minorities

also be able to survive and prosper in their everyday lives. Unfortunately, while it is one thing to express support for the idea of integration, it is quite another matter to ensure its realisation. In reality, many instances of segregation and separation persist in Estonia. Likewise, some minorities have chosen to assimilate their children (e.g., some Russian parents in Estonia choose to send their children to Estonian-language schools).

The differentiation between the many levels and segments of integration means that the process of forming a new, well structured, and well-functioning society is much more complicated than just the basic understanding of integration which focuses only on the two different language groups in Estonia, Estonians and Russians. It is possible to define the current situation in Estonia as the first stage of the integration process – namely, the acknowledgment of inter-ethnic problems and the enhancement of tolerance between the Estonians and Russian population. The next stage in the integration process will be transformation from such consolidation to efficient cooperation between Estonians as ethnic majority and Russian minority community (Kirch, Kirch, 1995).

For Russians in Estonia, the integration is a continuous process in which they became closer to Estonian society step by step without simultaneously losing their original cultural heritage. The Russians recognition of their ethnic unity (centred on the bilingual Estonian-Russian culture) has just begun to consolidate itself. Triin Vihalemm and Anu Masso argue that increased use of the Estonian language among the Russian youth is occurring in tandem with an increasing trust between the two linguistic groups (Vihalemm, Masso 2003: 115). For many people, however, language barriers still exist – while most Estonians (58 percent) have a good knowledge of Russian, most Estonian Russians have scant knowledge of the Estonian language, 38 percent have a good knowledge of Estonian (Census 2000). Discussing the development of the identity of Estonia's Russians and the potential for the formation of a common civic identity, the authors of "The Challenge of the Russian Minority" (Prof. Marju Lauristin, Triin Vihalemm, and others) assume that one's political and civic identities, as feelings of attachment to state and society, respectively, reinforce each other rather than form a deterministic relationship.

Recent situation: attitudes towards European Union and NATO

New models of social organisation that define the inner-Estonian and European sense of unity are important. These models will play a very essential role and might cause people to commit themselves effectively to the renewal of the society and might moreover guarantee stability.

The processes of political and economic transition in the eastern European countries are causing complex patterns of change in cultural and national

identities, but at the same time also a stronger support for a European identity by the former bearers and admirers of Soviet identity. The formation of the European identity as a collective identity has been taking place among Estonian people during the last dozen years since Estonia regained its independence in 1991. According to the surveys carried out by EMOR (Chart 1) the agenda of acknowledged problems has changed essentially in Estonia during the period 1991–2001.

First and foremost, there is noticeable shift in the recognition of ethnic relations as a major problem among both Estonians and ethnic Russians, especially among Russians. The percentage of the Russians who believed that ethnic relations constitute the major problem for Estonia has fallen from 75 percent in 1991 to 35 percent in 2001 (the corresponding shift among Estonians has been a little less dramatic). The concern about pollution as a major problem has decreased even more dramatically in both ethnic groups. At the same time, the concern about increasing inequality and unemployment has grown significantly. In 1991 only 42 percent of the Estonians were anxious about the employment situation. Over the decade this number had increased to 83 percent. The same indicator among ethnic Russians grew from 68 percent in 1991 to 87 percent in 2001 (see Chart 1).

As a rule the shifts of the attitudes of ethnic Russians concerning major problems has followed the trends among Estonians, in most of the cases even to a greater extent. In this respect the concern about unemployment is a slight exception, as well as the concern about emigration, which has been primarily the concern of ethnic Estonians. In 1991, 42 percent of Estonians considered it a major problem, in 2001 the same figure was only 26 percent. The Russians living in Estonia are only beginning to acknowledge the problem (see Chart 1).


During the period 1996–2000 the Russians living in Estonia were obviously interested in breaking down ethnic barriers, which was characterised by their growing support for Estonia's EU accession, but not NATO (in 2000 only 12 percent of Russians and 50 percent of Estonians supported NATO). But in 2001–2003 the positive attitudes of local Russians towards Estonia's NATO membership started to grow suddenly (in June 2003, 76 percent of Estonians and 52 percent of Russians supported NATO¹) (Post 2003).

Estonia's hopes for security guarantees related to accession to the EU and NATO were undoubtedly more clearly defined than the perceptions about identity architecture². Estonians saw the NATO security guarantees as a guarantee

¹ The last survey was conducted by research centre Faktum (led by Estonian sociologist Juhan Kivirähk).

² 'Identity architecture' is a term referred to by Aksel Kirch and Marika Kirch (see Kirch, Kirch 2001).

Chart 1. Acknowledged main problems of Estonia



Source: National sample. Data by EMOR.

of the maintenance of national independence. The ethnic identity of the people of Estonia were seen to be endangered mostly by other social circumstances (for example, de-population) but not the European Union.

The forecast of the future development of identity construction is complicated because of the tendencies of Estonian people not to identify themselves directly with their neighbours or to refer to similarities with Nordic countries. At the same time, Estonians are also unwilling to restore the identity that was inherent to Estonia during the pre-war period. Thus, being indisputably a part of Europe, Estonia's position there has not been conclusively defined. On the one hand our regional identity in European Union could become similar to that of the Nordic countries, but at the same time, Estonian identity has some specific features, which allude to the possibilities of belonging to the group of countries where individualistic values inherent to Anglo-Saxon cultural world prevail. Ireland and United Kingdom are good examples of those countries in Europe.

Attitudes towards accession to the European Union. Identity structure analysis

European identity is considered by us a social construct – shared sameness of the people belonging to the same group, their common narrative and in large scale matching attitudes and value estimations. The individual psychological level reflects all social tensions and conflicts that sometimes get anchored to EU-accession issues (Appendix I). The authors try to investigate these issues by applying the conceptual framework called Identity Structure Analysis (ISA). The method was developed by Prof. Peter Weinreich in order to study the structure of identity, since individuals differ in more ways than just their values (Weinreich 1989).

The data was gathered in the cities of Tallinn, Tartu, Viljandi, and Narva (N=235 persons) during the European Union enlargement process in Estonia in the end of 2002 and in May–June 2003, some months before the EU referendum, held on 14 September 2003. The questionnaire of the study consisted of 13 bipolar constructs, covering 13 independent dimensions of EU-related issues (Appendix II). The constructs reflected personal attitudes towards different economic strategies, the free movement of people, the role of EU-legislation in comparison with national legislation, minorities rights protection, etc.

Respondents were given the possibility to place themselves in positions (called an entities) of different self-images or in positions of significant others when trying to express his/her attitude about each particular bipolar construct on a 9-position scale. The list of entities remained unchanged in the case of each construct. Altogether eleven entities were used. The entities “Me as I am now (current self 1),” “Person whom I honour and admire (admired person),” “Me in 2000 (past self),” “Me as I would like to be (ideal self),” “Me when representing Estonia at EU negotiations in Brussels (current self 2),” and “Person whom I don’t like at all (disliked person)” were mandatory and required by the ISA method. The entities like “Estonia’s business circles,” “Estonia’s cultural elite,” “Euro-optimists in Estonia,” “Estonian Government,” and “Euro-sceptics in Estonia” represented facets of significant others in the questionnaire.

The results were analysed electronically by Identity Exploration Software (developed by Peter Weinreich). The indices to measure *idealistic identification*, *ego-involvement*, and *empathetic identification* were calculated. The definitions of these indices are given as follows:

Idealistic identification – degree of similarity between the qualities one attributes to the other and those one would like to possess as part of one’s ideal self-image.

Ego-involvement – one’s responsiveness to the other in terms of the extensiveness in both quality and strength of the attributes one construes the other as possessing.

Empathetic identification – the extent of one’s current identification with another is defined as the degree of similarity between the qualities one attributes to the other, whether “good” or “bad,” and those of one’s current self-image.


The following 3 hypotheses were postulated for testing:

- H 1. The EU-positive oriented subgroup has statistically higher idealistic identification with entities “Euro-optimists,” “Estonian Government,” “Estonian cultural elite,” and “Estonian business circles” than those who were against the accession.
- H 2. As Estonian society is facing the referendum, significant others like Euro-optimists and Euro-sceptics rather than the government, cultural elite, or business circle do have an impact on the development of the identity of our target groups.
- H 3. Empathetic identification with others like “cultural elite,” “business circles,” and “Estonian government” has increased among all groups compared to empathetic identification index values calculated on the basis of “Me as I am now” (current self) and “Me in 2000” (past self).

On the basis of results of city population studies in 2003, we can see that, despite the different identity constructs, people from Estonian cities had some common characteristics.

- 1. The idealistic identification index has a parameter range between 0 and 1. The values are considered high when above 0.70 and low when below 0.50. Therefore, the entities whose values resemble the values the Estonian “yes” group aspires to have are: “Euro-optimists,” “Estonian Government,” and “Estonian business circles”. For the Russian pro-accession group the entities like “Euro-optimists,” “Estonian business circles,” and “Estonian cultural elite” have the highest values of the same index (see Chart 2). These values show that the accession supporters of Estonian nationality seem to be hesitant to identify themselves with the cultural elite as worries about preservation of Estonian culture and language after accession have been mostly expressed by intellectuals and people engaged in the sphere of culture. At the same time the Russian pro-accession respondents’ index value is 0.66, showing that their identification level with the Estonian cultural elite is stronger than that of Russians belonging to another subgroup (i.e. “against the EU”) and even higher than among Estonians themselves. The latter finding is probably based on the Russians’ broader perception that no culture will be endangered when a nation joins the EU. The government’s lower idealisation among Russians can be ex-

CHART 2. Idealistic identification with others. Estonians and Russians by their attitude about the EU-accession



plained by the fact that it represents an authority associated with strict demands in the form of the Estonian language law and citizenship policy (although during the last decade several of these requirements in respective legal acts have been loosened).

2. In order to measure the magnitude of ego-involvement with others, the *Ego-involvement index* was calculated (see Table 1).

TABLE 1. Ego-involvement with others among Estonians and Russians

Entity / average and subgroups	Estonians	Russians
Euro-sceptics	4,40	4,14
Pro accession	4,26	4,20
Against accession	4,42	4,38
Euro-optimists	4,41	4,14
Pro accession	4,42	4,34
Against accession	4,40	3,99
Estonian government	3,24	3,66
Pro accession	3,30	3,79
Against accession	3,08	3,71
Estonian business circles	2,95	3,38
Pro accession	3,17	3,48
Against accession	2,65	2,96
Estonian cultural elite	2,83	3,19
Pro accession	2,80	3,22
Against accession	2,98	2,98

The index makes it possible to estimate the relative impact of others in the development of one's own identity. The index has a parameter range between 0 and 5, and the values are considered high when above 4 and low when below 2. The results show that ego-involvement is very high among both ethnic groups in the case of "Euro-sceptics" and "Euro-optimists," and only slightly below the cut-off point in the case of those Russians who were negative about Estonia joining the EU. At the same time the government, business circles, and the cultural elite have a moderate involvement level when shaping the identity structure of respondents. High ego-involvement with Euro-optimists and Euro-sceptics shows the presence of high standards of democratic political environment and openness in Estonia as both of these entities are significant while being opposite facets of one's world-view. This balanced situation should benefit the orientation of today's changing society now that it is becoming a full member of the European Union.

- Answers of different groups vary depending on their city's size, status, location, and ethnic composition (see Table 2).

TABLE 2. Empathetic Identification, based on Current Self 1 (in 2003) and Past Self (in 2000) among Estonians and Russians by city

Entity	E S T O N I A N S			R U S S I A N S	
	Tallinn	Tartu	Viljandi	Tallinn	Narva
Euro-sceptics					
Emp. Ident. CS1	0.52	0.46	0.63	0.52	0.43
Emp. Ident. PS	0.51	0.47	0.60	0.52	0.44
Euro-optimists					
Emp. Ident. CS1	0.53	0.50	0.39	0.39	0.49
Emp. Ident. PS	0.53	0.54	0.43	0.42	0.52
Estonian government					
Emp. Ident. CS1	0.54	0.50	0.42	0.39	0.42
Emp. Ident. PS	0.54	0.54	0.45	0.46	0.36
Estonian business circles					
Emp. Ident. CS1	0.64	0.66	0.60	0.52	0.59
Emp. Ident. PS	0.60	0.62	0.55	0.54	0.53
Estonian cultural elite					
Emp. Ident. CS1	0.62	0.52	0.72	0.52	0.44
Emp. Ident. PS	0.56	0.54	0.67	0.50	0.45

For a Russian-populated industrial border town like Narva, located near Russia, empathy neither with Euro-optimists or Euro-sceptics makes sense. The Estonian government and business circles seem more important among the significant others, compared to the Russians from Tallinn. On the other

hand – Viljandi – a small Estonian-dominated town in Southern Estonia, having the Culture Academy as its main intellectual centre, is worrying about the preservation of Estonian culture and language and not favourably evaluating the government's EU integration efforts at all because they see it as endangering Estonian national identity. We can notice a feeling of anxiety of Estonians derived from being a small nation in the European Union. Tartu as the university-city shows significantly more EU-optimism than Viljandi and gives Estonian business circles the highest evaluation of all the cities. Despite the academic atmosphere, Tartu's empathy with the cultural elite stays surprisingly only at the moderate level.

The capital city of Estonia – Tallinn – has with no doubt taken a leading role in the country's EU integration. The most common characteristic feature for the Estonians living in Tallinn is their growing empathetic identification with Estonian cultural elite as well as with the local business circles. In the conditions of being a capital city with relatively high EU-consciousness their empathy with Euro-optimists and Euro-sceptics is expressed almost equally.

Post-referendum situation in Estonia: Dilemmas for Estonians and Estonian Russians

The share of those who at the referendum voted in favour of the European Union was 66.8 per cent while the percentage of those who voted against the membership was 33.2. The overall participation rate in Estonia was 64.1 per cent (Estonian...2003).

In October 2003, EMOR carried out a public opinion survey in Estonia with a nation wide sample (EMOR 2003). Among the respondents, 80 per cent of citizens said that they could participate in the referendum. The respondents had to estimate the results of the referendum. The overall satisfaction with the results was 70 percent among citizens and 42 percent among those who were not citizens of the Republic of Estonia. We can say that citizenship and ethnicity played an important role in the answers regarding satisfaction. Seventy two percent of the Estonians were satisfied with the results, while the average satisfaction among the non-Estonians was 48 percent. But as expected, the satisfaction rate was significantly higher among those non-Estonians who were citizens of Estonia (56 percent). These differences also reflect distinctions between the two ethnic groups under analysis. Estonian citizenship might be seen by the Russian minority also as a step in upward mobility: Estonia's move towards Europe could mean to them a move to a space where they could find employment and participate in this process more actively than in small Estonia (Pavelson 2002: 42).

Since 1 May 2004 on we are able to refer to Estonia's new identity as an EU member state. It is quite likely that the new supranational identity will have great influence on the self-determination of the inhabitants of Estonia and state-oriented identity will acquire greater importance than ethnic identification. Estonia will recede from its previous status as a "former Soviet republic" and become more and more a member state of the European Union. It is evident that Estonia's accession to EU will bring along not only reconciliation with the Western economic system and legal culture, but also the adoption of European values, European political culture, etc. In addition to that, the rise of a national self-consciousness has been observed in many EU member states immediately after accession.

However, the population of Estonia cannot be treated as a carrier of a single new national identity yet. The problem might arise with those social factors and mechanisms that ought to assure the continuation of inner-state cultural (in terms of the formation of a multi-cultural society) and national integration (in the terms of citizenship). Will the young Russian-speaking population living in Estonia turn into multi-cultural ethnic group with significant Estonian linguistic and cultural background or will the national (state-determined) identity become a significant value for them?

Professor Sergei Issakov has expressed the opinion that Estonia has already gone on the way of significant integration. According to his views, an interesting process of the formation of a new ethnic group and a new ethno-cultural community – Estonian Russians – is evidently underway. This is a group with their own subculture similar to the French-speaking population in Canada or Swedish-speaking Finns. According to Issakov, "we remain Russians by our language, culture, and self-consciousness. But, however, we are not identical to Russians living in Russia or let's say, to the Russians living in America" (Issakov 2004).

It is inevitable that the close relations between economic processes and local political life compel the alien population to become citizens of their country of residence sooner or later. Therefore it is worth to note that there exists an interesting strategy for the integration of the Russians in Estonia elaborated in Moscow. One of the propagators of these ideas, Renald Simonjan claims in his book "Russia and the Baltic states" that in the consequence of ethnic processes among the Russians in Estonia (and in Latvia and Lithuania), a new sub-ethnic group with specific type of identity – "European Russians" – will be developed (Симо́нян 2003). This concept of the Russian sociologist is based on the pragmatic presumption that an economic bridge between Russia and the European Union will be created, but it doesn't take into consideration other important aspects, i.e. the similarity of Estonia (Latvia, Lithuania) and the European cultural background, that could constitute a sufficient basis for a single European identity.

Conclusions


Due to the Estonia's EU membership, a European dimension is going to be part of Estonians' self-perception, accompanied by increasing ties with European institutions. The identity structure analysis data also refer to common trends in the changes of the identity of Estonians and Russians. The status of European citizen should help form an identity for Estonian Russians and other ethnic groups and it is very likely to be influenced by European values. Probably one cultural environment will not just be replaced by another but by an essentially wider cultural space. A problem for Estonia could emerge concerning those social factors and mechanisms that should secure the continuation of Estonia's inner cultural and national integration.

The new international context – Estonia as a new member of EU and NATO – also gives new opportunities for local ethnic and national integration. During the debate that took place immediately before Estonia joined the EU, the majority of citizens realised that EU membership does not mean unconditional loss of Estonia's ethnic and national identity but provides new possibilities to define the country's position on Europe's geopolitical map.

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APPENDIX I



APPENDIX II

Questionnaire of the study

Each page of the questionnaire had one of the 13 bipolar constructs in the top. The entities on the left side expressed facets of respondent's world-picture. He/she had to cross one position for each entity of the scale (see the example below)

	1L EU laws are liberal enough in regulating market economy	1R EU laws are too tough for liberal economy
Me as I am now	- - - - 0 - -	X - - - -
Estonia 's business circles	- - X - 0 - - - -	
Person who I honour and admire	- - - - 0 - X - -	
Me in 2000	- - - - 0 X - - -	
Estonia's cultural elite	- -X- - 0 - - - -	
Euro-optimists in Estonia	- - X - 0 - - - -	
Me as I would like to be	- - - - 0 - -	X - - - -
Estonia's Government	- - - - 0 - -	X - - - -
Me when representing the state at EU negotiations in Brussels	- - - X 0 - - - -	
Euro-sceptics in Estonia	- - - - 0 - - -	X
Person who I don't like at all	- - - X 0 - - - -	

The constructs. The following constructs were used at the top of each page while list of the entities remained unchanged throughout the instrument.

2L New member states cause extensive changes in EU policies (especially in agriculture)

2R New member states adapt existing system, and EU policies do not change very much as a consequence

3L The EU is under way to a bureaucratic organisation, unable to reform oneself

3R The EU remains ability to develop and reform

4L Regional co-operation (Visegrad, Nordic, Baltic) is more important for successful accession to the EU

4R Bilateral negotiations with Brussels are more essential for successful accession

5L The EU is capable of guaranteeing peace, stable development, and security

5R The EU is not able to cope with conflicts and guarantee security in every member state

6L Protection of rights of minorities is guaranteed in the EU

6R Protection of rights of minorities in EU is not guaranteed well enough

7L Common law of EU is an essential guarantee for democracy in the member states

7R EU has to intervene permanently into domestic politics of its member states as existing legislation is not sufficient for guaranteeing stability

8L Free movement of employees between the member states gives better job opportunities for people

8R Common labour market causes many problems due to migrants

9L In the EU protection of human rights is guaranteed well enough

9R Protection of human rights in the EU has turned into an empty cliché

10L EU-accession endangers the development of Estonian language and culture

10R EU membership promotes and encourages the development of Estonian language and culture

11L Most important are the liberties and welfare of EU citizens

11R Most important are the aims of the EU as a supranational body

12L The EU is a supranational formation that in a certain degree restricts decision-making and independence of the states themselves

12R The EU is a voluntary union, originating on common decision-making and rights delegated to the union

13L Partial legalisation of drugs will contribute to the containment of illegal drug use

13R Partial legalisation of drugs will contribute to the spread of drug use

ESTŪ IR ESTIJOJE GYVENANČIŲ RUSŲ TAPATUMŲ DINAMIKA PRIEŠ IR PO REFERENDUMO DĖL NARYSTĖS ES

Aksel Kirch, Mait Talts, Tarmo Tuisk

EUROPOS INSTITUTAS, AUDENTES UNIVERSITETAS, TALINAS, ESTIJA

SANTRAUKA. Straipsnyje analizuojami empiriniai duomenys apie Estijos miestų gyventojų nuostatas dėl šalies narystės Europos Sąjungoje. Tyrimas buvo atliktas Talino, Tartu, Viljandi ir Narvos miestuose (N=235). Duomenys buvo renkami 2002 m. pabaigoje ir 2003 m. balandžio–birželio mėnesiais, prieš referendumą dėl stojimo į ES. Referendumas dėl Estijos stojimo į ES įvyko 2003-ųjų rugsėjo 14 dieną. Tapatumo struktūrinės analizės metodas, sukurtas prof. P.Weinreicho (Ulster universitetas), autorių buvo pritaikytas tiriant asmens tapatumo struktūrą Estijoje. Buvo išskirti keli pagrindiniai veiksniai, kurie turėjo įtakos Estijos gyventojų nuostatomis dėl šalies stojimo į ES 2002–2003 metais. Vienas svarbiausių tyrimo atradimų buvo tai, kad teigiamas estų nusiteikimas dėl stojimo į ES yra lydimas siekio perimti Europos vertybes ir kultūrinės tradicijas. Naujas tarptautinis kontekstas teikia naujų galimybių lokaliai etno-tautinei integracijai. Diskusijose, kurios vyko prieš pat Estijai tampa ES nare, dauguma piliečių suvokė, kad narystė Europos Sąjungoje nereiškia besąlygiško tautinio tapatumo praradimo, bet kaip tik suteikia naujų galimybių įtvirtinti šalies pozicijas Europos kultūriniame ir geopolitiniame žemėlapyje.

Gauta 2004 metų spalį
Įteikta spaudai 2004 metų gruodį