Development of a Monitoring Framework for Migration and Integration Policy: Czech Republic, Poland and Sweden

Jakob Hurrle
MULTICULTURAL CENTRE PRAGUE, CZECH REPUBLIC

Abstract. Prepared as part of the project Third Country Nationals in Lithuania: Assessment and Indexes of Integration Policy, this article contrasts selected aspects of the experience of the Czech Republic and Poland, the two countries in central and Eastern Europe that attract the largest number of immigrants to the region, with Sweden as an old immigration country, which is often considered as one of the most positive examples of a functioning integration policy. Providing a comparative view of key aspects of migration and integration reality in the countries concerned, the article puts the migration policies of the Czech Republic and Poland into a wider context in order to shed some light on the question whether Czech and Polish policy makers have been able to use the opportunity to learn from the experiences of others. The article further provides an overview of the methodological experiences of the Czech Republic, Sweden and Poland, including highlights for the assessment of migration and integration policies and information about statistical data. The paper provides a comparative background for debating policy prospects in other countries such as Lithuania.

Keywords: Migration policy, integration policy, migrants.

Introduction

The political and economic reorganisation of the eastern half of the European continent after 1989 was accompanied by a significant increase in the migration of people. The directions and trajectories of migrants in the region mirror the development of central and Eastern Europe since the beginning of the transformation. In the first years of the transformation, which were characterized by political instability and the collapse of economic output, the region was primarily the place of origin for a large number of people who sought better prospects in Western European countries. At the same time, countries having direct borders with Western Europe, such as Poland or the Czech Republic, became important transit stations for political refugees and economic migrants on their way to the West.

In this period, the old EU member states sought ways to prevent an uncontrollable influx of people. It can be argued that fear of unwanted
migration has indeed been one of the main rationales for the very process of EU enlargement. As a consequence of this process, migration in the region of central and Eastern Europe became more and more diverse. Strong economic growth transformed countries like the Czech Republic to favourite destinations for labour migrants, which originate from disadvantaged parts of central and Eastern Europe, and increasingly also from Asia.

Many of the new EU member states in the region at the same time continue losing, at least temporarily, a large number of people to Western European labour markets.\(^1\) Prior to the current economic changes, which reduced the demand for labour, most of the countries in the region saw attempts, or at least discussions about possible policies, to fill the gaps created by this outflow with new migrants. As wage levels continue to be in most of the new member states dramatically below the average levels in the common market of the EU, attracting workers from other, even less developed EU member states, will in many cases not be a viable option. Immigration from the third countries, and the integration of these citizens into the new member state’s societies, is therefore a challenge that most states in the region will face.

The countries of central and Eastern Europe happened to turn into countries of immigration at a time when the longer immigration experience of many Western European countries is increasingly critically re-examined. In view of experiences of Western European countries, the societies of the new immigration countries of central and Eastern Europe are, at least theoretically, in the happy position to learn from history. At least theoretically, their position is even more favourable, since Western Europe offers both negative examples and plenty of positive inspirations.

The chances of such learning should not be overstated, however. Alas, there are a number of reasons why it is rather difficult to draw and apply lessons from the history of others. In the field of migration policy, one especially important impediment is the often-chaotic and non-systematic genesis of migration regimens. Even though governments might assign one ministry with the formulation of the country’s immigration policy, the emerging migration regimen needs to be understood as a much broader set of policies, rules and incentives that were created by a large number of actors for purposes that in many cases are not even directly related to migration.

\(^1\) For recent information about the migration flows in Eastern Europe, see a report on migration trends in Soderkoping Process countries (Leoncikas, Zibas 2009).
Which lessons to learn? Comparative views on selected migration and integration issues

Migration history and contemporary migration-integration issues in the Czech Republic, Poland and Sweden have their specific contexts of historical past, economic structure, and political system. The differences notwithstanding, it is possible to identify four main motives behind immigration to these countries: (1) search of work, (2) protection from persecution, (3) ethnic kinship, and (4) family unification.²

In the following, we will mainly focus on labour migration since this type of migration is a new and significant strand of migration that may also lay grounds for family unification or other types of migration in the future.

Labour immigration

Similar to Poland, Lithuania lost a significant share of its domestic work force due to out-migration over the last years. As a consequence, the Lithuanian economy experienced shortages of labour prior to the economic crisis. Not surprisingly, some branches of the Lithuanian economy began to tap the labour market of Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova (and even of China and Turkey). While the economic crisis led to a reduced demand for labour, it seems rather likely that this is a temporary stage. Especially if out-migration continues, Lithuania might soon be facing problems with labour supply.

Approach to domestic labour force

Opening the borders to workers from poorer countries is controversial almost everywhere. While some resistance is based on cultural fears or outright xenophobia, concerns about the impact on the situation in the domestic labour market can be legitimate and should not be dismissed with false truisms such as “migration is beneficial for all sides involved.” While this often-made statement might in many situations be true if looking on sending and receiving countries as a whole, it tends to be more problematic when looking specifically

² This list is certainly not sufficient to include all cases (since there are other reasons relevant for smaller groups, e.g. access to farmland in case of Dutch farmers purchasing land in Poland or the Czech Republic, and motives related to lifestyle in the case of Prague’s American diaspora), which are too specific or insignificant to be discussed in this article.
at the position of vulnerable parts of the domestic workforce, such as members of ethnic minorities or inhabitants of disadvantaged regions. If labour shortages are not reaching a scale that endangers the economy as such, such groups’ employment prospects tend to increase if labour is scarce as this forces employers to overcome prejudices or accept additional costs (such as relocation to disadvantaged areas or provision of housing/transportation for employees from these regions).

The three countries in question pursued quite different policies in order to protect their domestic workforce. The most restrictive case is Poland, which only recently began to implement programmes for the recruitment of foreign workers. Arguably, one result of this strategy is high share of illegal migrants and undocumented work relations.

Concerns for the domestic workforce also had a great impact on the formulation of Swedish policies. As mentioned above, Sweden limited the free access to its labour market in 1972 in reaction to a changing economic situation. However, at least in regard to workers from the new member states, the country’s strategy has not been to keep its borders closed, but to strictly enforce Swedish labour and payment standards. Paradoxically, this seems to have helped to greatly reduce Sweden’s attractiveness as a destination country, since migrants have been unable to make full use of their competitive advantages such as greater flexibility and lower wage demands. It seems necessary to add that the Swedish approach could be harder to sustain in a society where trade unions tend to be weak and labour relations are informal.

The third approach represents the case of the Czech Republic, which experienced in the years after 2004 a dynamic increase of the number of foreign workers. While labour migration was for a long time hardly ever discussed in the political sphere, the actual policy seems to have been based on the presumption that it is necessary to satisfy the need of the economy for flexible and cheap labour. While unemployment went down, there remained a significant group of unemployed, especially in disadvantaged regions where the economic structure used to be dominated by agriculture, the textile industry, or heavy industry (the majority of foreigners are employed through agencies as manual workers in construction, the textile industry, agriculture-forestry, and especially manufacturing).

Is the employment of foreigners in this situation the best choice? From the perspective of employers, it is a desired short-term solution, since the recruitment of highly flexible foreigners, who agree with small, overcrowded

---

3 Many of the unemployed are long-term unemployed, and many are Roma. Another disadvantaged group are the elderly.
living spaces, promises to be less costly than e.g. the provision of family housing for Czech workers or relocation to areas with underdeveloped transportation infrastructure. From the perspective of the state, the answer is more difficult, however. A liberal approach towards migration seems to have been politically the least risky choice, since this did not require the start of reforms, which would certainly have generated a lot of political opposition (e.g. the abolishment of the divided housing market, the reform of the welfare benefit system). To be fair towards the political decision-makers, it is necessary to also realize that they were acting under time constraints, because such reforms would have taken time and investors might have turned their back on the country if they had grown more and more frustrated with the lack of supply in the labour market.

**Labour market: inclusive or divided?**

Closely related to the question discussed above is the position of foreigners in society and in the labour market. Sweden and the Czech Republic appear in this respect to be two extreme opposites: While Sweden pursued from the beginning a policy of equal payments and rights with labour unions as central players, the Czech Republic experienced the emergence of a divided labour market over the past several years. On one hand, there is the official labour market, where people (Czechs and foreigners working in higher positions) are employed in accordance with the Labour Code, which has the reputation of being employee-friendly and inflexible. On the other hand is the world of agency employment. Even though the law guarantees the same conditions for all workers in the same position, in reality these conditions happen to be gravely violated. The deeper cause of this situation, however, is the lack of rights and desperation of many labour migrants, who fear losing their job since this could bring with it the loss of the right to stay in the country. As long as migrants are afraid to complain, it seems doubtful whether controls will have the power to bring about fundamental changes.

**Formal and informal, legal and illegal**

One important aspect that has a huge impact is the size of the informal economy and tolerance of informal labour relations. In this regard, Poland and Sweden can be considered opposite prototypes. While labour migration to Poland is predominantly occurring informally in the economy, which is characterized by a comparably high tolerance towards informal business and
work relations, Sweden’s world of labour is highly regulated. Interestingly, Sweden’s high level of regulation and social control represents a major obstacle for illegal migrants, who are said to leave Sweden often out of frustration with the high level of social control.

The migrant employment structures of the Czech Republic can be considered a rather unhealthy mixture of legal and illegal practices. One the one hand, the predominant practice of employing foreigners through agencies allows businesses to act in full accordance with the law. On the other hand, another problem of the current system is the “production” of illegality: It is very easy for a migrant to become illegal, e.g. because of minor administrative problems. In many cases, migrants are not even aware of this since they are “managed” by intermediaries. As the right to stay in the country is linked to the continuation of employment with a specific employer, the threat of making someone illegal is at the same time a powerful tool in the hands of intermediaries to prevent outspoken protest against bad working conditions or even mistreatment.

Family reunification

Family reunification has developed into one of the major immigration channels to Sweden and other Western European countries. It is still a relatively insignificant and not much debated phenomenon in Poland and the Czech Republic. This might change over time, however, as migrants settle and minorities grow in size. This could bring important policy implications. In places where minorities are large, the legal protection of the family represents a major challenge to any attempts at reducing migration to a minimum. Family reunification rights are more difficult to change through political decisions than is the case with schemes for labour migration since they derive directly from the protection of the family in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. However, the prospect of continuous and path-dependent migration streams can also be interpreted as a powerful argument in favour of integration policies. The “uncontrollable growth” or “perpetual renewal” of immigrant populations will be perceived as much more problematic when minorities live apart from the rest of society.

---

4 Many of the agencies have a bad reputation since they are said to violate frequently the rights of migrants, even if these migrants are legally in the country.
Integration issues and policies

Concerning systematic approaches towards integration, Sweden, the Czech Republic, and Poland can be seen as representing different stages of policy development. While Sweden represents the case of a country with a very developed policy, Poland is still in a situation where a systematic approach is lacking. Unlike in Sweden and, to a lesser extent, the Czech Republic, there are also very few NGOs in Poland dealing with migrant integration issues. The Czech Republic might be seen as being somewhere in-between the two extremes of Sweden and Poland since there exists a policy conception that however leaves a number of important questions open and is only partially implemented.5

For the sake of comparison, important elements in the Swedish integration strategy are the emphasis on equal rights, the support of cultural diversity, and the involvement of local governments. It is remarkable that other elements that are widely discussed in other countries, such as compulsory language tests, are at this point not applied in Sweden. Sweden instead relies on providing opportunities for learning the Swedish language.

In the case of the Czech Republic, a first version of the National Integration Strategy was published in 2000 and has been updated regularly since then. The document can be considered to be quite progressive, as it is built on the premise that integration is a two-way process that demands adaptation not only from the migrants, but also from the receiving society. However, the existence of such a policy document should not be mistaken with the implementation of a coherent policy.

In the perspective of the author of this study, one central limitation in the Czech framework for integration policy is the rather unclear definition of the target group. Another major problem with the Czech integration strategy is an almost complete lack of respective policy strategies on the regional and municipal level. Some of the cities and towns where major foreign direct investments in the manufacturing sector have led to an inflow of migrants seem

---

5 It is interesting to see how this translates into the country’s assessment by the British Council’s well-known Migration Integration Policy Index (Niessen, J., Huddleston, T., Citron, L. 2007). While Sweden holds first place in all the six policy strands examined, the Czech Republic (17th place) has a slightly more favourable overall rating than Poland (21st place), although Poland is assessed more favourably in three of the six policy strands (family reunion, long-term residence, and anti-discrimination). However, as in the example of the Czech Republic, where increasing interest by the state and the EU in the migration issue led to an increase in regulation, it would be a wrong to expect that a more systematic approach would also be an approach that is more migrant-friendly.
to feel overwhelmed by these rapid changes. This became in particular visible when the economic crisis led to the layoff of thousands of migrant workers and the cities feared an increase in crime and the number of homeless people.

With regard to Poland, Iglicka (Sourcebook… 2007: 265) commented that the “integration component [is] among the least significant face of Polish immigration policy”. She points out that the Polish government has not developed a comprehensive strategy for the integration of migrants. The inactivity of the state is also not compensated for by civil society, since there are few organisations in Poland that deal with the integration of migrants. The situation changed somewhat thanks to the creation of the European Integration Fund. Having led to the support of various projects in this field, the resources of the fund are distributed through the Ministry of the Interior.

Social and political rights

The Swedish reforms of the 1970s were promoted under the title “Equality, Freedom of Choice, Co-operation” and had a strong focus on the provision of rights. Non-naturalized migrants were given the right to vote in municipal and regional elections, and the trade union began to function as powerful watchdogs against the violation of social rights in the labour market.

From the perspective of the current situation in the Czech Republic and some other new immigration countries of central and Eastern Europe, where we can observe tendencies of an effective division in the labour market between a better-protected domestic workforce and a much worse-protected foreign workforce, the stress of equal rights seems the most relevant aspect of the Swedish experience. Interestingly, in regard to the labour market, the main argument for equality was never the protection of foreigners but the protection of the Swedish labour force, who would have to fear an erosion of wage and social protection standards when put into a competition with foreigners not enjoying (or, as some might see it, bound by) these standards.

In the Czech Republic, the most broadly discussed problem of migrants is their economic exploitation and mistreatments by employers and especially intermediaries. Yet the division of the workforce into overwhelmingly domestic core staff, which is in some branches quite well-organized, and agency workers (usually only foreigners), who are legally employed by a different company, is a

---

6 Such practices are illegal since Czech Labour Law demands equal treatment and remuneration for people working in the same positions.
factor that makes violations easier in the “second-class” sector. This also makes it almost impossible to organize migrants in trade unions, since agencies can simply transfer their employees to another company if he/she expresses interest in joining the local branch of the labour union. And there exist no specific labour unions for agency-employed workers to combat this problem. Though unions have expressed concern about the spread of agency employment (rightly also interpreted as a threat to the position of domestic workers), it would go too far to speak of a systematic fight on behalf of migrant workers.\(^7\)

In general, the Czech Republic and Poland are certainly well-advised to study the strong emphasis on equality practiced in Sweden, even though one might object that the Swedish model will not function in a non-Scandinavian society, where trade unions are weaker, corruption and informal labour relations more widespread, and social control less effective. It should, however, not be overlooked that the Swedish success story is not also without weaknesses. Though Sweden has so far not experienced a rise in populist and openly xenophobic parties, it seems fair to say that the relationship between the Swedes and “their” foreigners has somewhat cooled. Moreover, a political and societal consensus on migration and integration policy does no longer exist.

**Structures, strategies and institutions**

**Formulation of migration and integration policies**

Being influenced by economic processes, cultural patterns, and political decisions and concerning different categories of state interests such as social stability, economic growth, and security, migration and integration are classic cross-sectoral issues. Even if a certain state body is assigned to deal with migration and integration issues, it is clear that the policies of other ministries will have a significant impact on overall development.

The Swedish integration model was developed on the basis of a political consensus between Sweden’s political parties. Over time, a number of specific

\(^7\) In some companies where the number of agency workers was very high, unions actually seemed to be more involved in protecting the domestic workforce by insisting on the maintenance of differences in the treatment of core staff and agency-employed workers. There are, however, also other examples. Shocking news about the mistreatment of migrant workers by agencies led in the case of Škoda Auto to the creation of an interesting model, in which trade union representatives and company management meet regularly in a specific council that monitors the treatment of migrant workers. The council is authorized to terminate the relations with recruitment agencies if there are violations of rights.
institutions\footnote{Such as the Swedish Immigration Board, the Department of Integration, and the Minister of Migration (part of the Foreign Office). In 1997, the Immigration Board was split into two entities. The first was the Integration Board (abolished in June 2007), and the second was the Migration Board, which deals with immigration permits, assignment of refugee status, and citizenship. Additional functions are the ethnic discrimination ombudsman (appointed in 1986) and migration court (2005), where refused asylum seekers can appeal.} were created. Concerning policymaking, it should be mentioned that the Swedish parliament has also played an active role. For example, in 2004 it refused to follow the suggestion of the prime minister and voted to open Sweden’s labour market to workers from the new member states.

If comparing the case of Sweden with the one of the Czech Republic and Poland, the most striking difference is probably the role of the political debate on immigration. Unlike in Sweden, where migration and integration policy was driven by political debate, the quite dynamic development of migration policy instruments occurred in the central and Eastern European states with very limited public participation or political debate.

The interpretation of migration and integration issues as being technical rather than political issues has its good and bad sides. Given the political culture of countries like the Czech Republic, where public debate tends to be disconnected from policy analysis, it is partially unclear whether the issue's discovery by politicians would bring any improvements. At least in the shorter run, it seems on the contrary more likely that increasing public discussion will strengthen anti-immigration voices. The topic's long absence from the public discourse contributed certainly to the lack of a clear overall strategy, however.

Dividing responsibilities: state, regional and local authorities and civil society

The legal framework for immigration is mostly determined by state government (and, by delegation of power, the EU).\footnote{It launches green card programmes, issues visas and work permits, and decides about various things from rules for the gaining of permanent residence and citizenship to the regional distribution of asylum seekers.} However, despite this powerful role, it is especially important in regard to integration to focus not only on central government initiatives, but also on conceptions and activities that exist on a regional and local level. In fact, it is on the municipal level where integration needs to happen, and it is also in the municipality where the negative consequences of non-integration will be felt most directly.
For a long time, Sweden encouraged its municipalities to launch their own migration initiatives. Many municipalities invested significant resources into cultural and educational programmes for migrants living in the municipality. Some also created local immigrant councils as a body that would be responsible for dialogue with immigrant communities. Possibly, the interest of municipalities in their migrants was also strengthened by the granting of voting rights to migrants in local elections, as this might have supported a view of migrants as being part of the constituency of local politicians. In recent years, as the political climate becomes more sceptical towards migration, many municipalities have reduced their activities.

In the case of the Czech Republic, one of the most serious deficits of the existing state strategy for the integration of foreigners is the lack of strategies (and indeed activities) on the regional and local level. Even though there are cities where a quite significant share of the population are foreigners, cities seem not yet ready for the idea that the integration of these people might be an important challenge for the future. Accordingly, activities in favour of foreigners tend to be of limited scale and are often realized as part of the support of ethnic minorities with a focus on the preservation of minority culture. The whole framework of ethnic minority protection seems inadequate, as it lumps together highly assimilated groups, such as Czech Germans, whose biggest concern might be the survival of the group’s existence, with non-integrated newcomers, whose needs are completely different.

Regarding the division of tasks and responsibilities, we should think not only about the concentration or devolution of tasks within the state, but also about the role of non-state actors such as non-governmental organisations, trade unions, churches, and private enterprises.

There exists a wide range of theoretical literature about the function of civil society institutions and the relationship between these institutions and the state. Anyway, it seems possible to conclude that most countries of central and Eastern Europe have not yet developed a very clear idea how this relationship should work. Lacking a strong basis of members or private supporters, NGOs tend to be quite dependent on financial support from the state, which is usually provided in the form of project grants. In many cases, the role of NGOs could be described as one of service providers (both to the state and to their clients) that offer services that the state and local municipalities are not able or willing to provide. The practice of offering counselling through NGOs rather than directly through state bodies is probably in the interest of the target group, since NGO activists might be more motivated than state employees to help their clients. In the view of the author of this article, the state should develop different funding schemes for different
kinds of NGO activities. While competitive grant schemes might be the right approach to select ideas for activities, constant need for perpetual fundraising is counterproductive for activities that should be offered on a continuous basis, such as counselling or running integration centres.

In case of the Czech Republic, where the sphere of NGOs is quite well-developed, a number of NGOs do in relation to the government fulfil at the same time the role of watchdogs and independent experts. Obviously, this can be difficult in a situation of financial dependency towards the state.

In Sweden’s immigration history, trade unions have had a pivotal role. Both generally and especially in regard to migration, their role is incomparably less significant in the Czech Republic and Poland. There is less of a tradition for the political involvement of trade unions in issues that are not directly linked to the material concerns of their members. Trade unions have been highly unsuccessful in organizing foreign workers, and in some cases the concerns of migrant workers are even perceived as those of a group of competitors to the domestic workforce.

Assessing migration and evaluating integration success–experiences from Sweden, the Czech Republic and Poland

Methods to establish the number of immigrants.
Counting–data sources and methods

Official data on the number of immigrants living in a country is usually based on data from population registries. Usually, these figures are broken down by country of citizenship, and it is therefore possible to identify the size of communities coming from other countries. To track migration dynamics, it is in addition to this possible to use other “hard” data that might be available from national statistical agencies or provided by state ministries and specialized bodies, such as the number of visas issued (by type and country or by embassy), work permits, long-term residence statuses, or cases of naturalization. One useful tool for comparing available data in different European countries is the PROMINSTAT database, which is described by its inventors as “a comprehensive inventory of statistical datasets on migration, integration and discrimination in Europe [which]… currently contains descriptions of more than 1,200 statistical datasets”10.

10 See: http://www.prominstat.eu/prominstat/database/
While official data is usually based on data on the number of foreigners living legally in a country, there are a number of difficulties that apply, especially in the case of international comparisons. The first of these difficulties is the question of how the national statistical offices define *migrant* or *immigrant*. Depending on the definition, groups that are usually not considered to be immigrants (e.g. students, voluntary workers) might be included in the data, while other groups (e.g. people with a business visa, posted workers, and temporary migrants) might be left out. Even though national statistical offices are working on a unification of definitions, this process is difficult since it involves not only statistical designations but also differences in legal norms and processes. There are for example still differences in regard to the number of months a migrant must live in a country to be counted (e.g., Poland: longer than 6 months; Sweden longer than 12 months). In some countries (e.g., the Czech Republic), the existence of certain types of permits that do not require registration in a municipality (visa for the purpose of business) also make it difficult to estimate the number of foreigners in a given local municipality. In the case of Poland’s 2002 census, unclear definitions of who was supposed to be counted as an immigrant led to serious problems. As a consequence, the size of the immigrant population was probably underestimated.

Specific aspects emerge in the case of migrants from the ethnic diaspora (who are usually automatically granted citizenship and therefore not included), naturalized migrants (who remain immigrants from a sociological point of view yet figure in the statistics as ordinary citizen), and members of the second and third generation (who are not migrants in the strict sense of the word yet remain in some cases holders of foreign passports). The most common way to address these difficulties is to use not citizenship, but place of birth as the criterion. Since 2000, all OECD countries have incorporated in their census a question on the country of birth of persons enumerated, as well as on their nationality.

We must however also be aware that an analysis of population data by *place of birth* can lead to undesired results. In the case of the Czech Republic, this criterion would include people born in the Slovak part of Czechoslovakia who moved to the Czech part before 1993 and who became Czech citizens simply by registering in their Czech home municipality. In Poland, a significant share of the elderly generation was born in territories that are now part of Belarus, Lithuania, and Ukraine. Since the Polish Statistical Office uses post-1945 borders even for people born before 1945, strict application of the *place of birth* category will produce a large number of “immigrants” who are actually Polish citizens born on Polish soil. Statistically less significant yet telling would
be the opposite case of a German pensioner, who was born in the German city of Breslau (today's Wroclaw) and decides to move in his old days from Germany to Warsaw. If the place of birth category is used, he would not be counted as an immigrant.

Evaluation methodologies for assessment of migration and integration policies

The perspective of indicators

In recent years, indicators have become an increasingly important tool for the tracking of policy implementation. In its simplest form, an indicator is a descriptive statistical figure that is selected for its significance to provide information on the social phenomenon in question (e.g., percentage of children of foreign citizenship in district schools). One way to use such an indicator is to identify trends over time (time rows). Using the example of the school district, an analysis based on this development might identify trends such as the dynamic increase of children of foreign nationality or, if data are sufficiently segregated, their concentration in certain areas or schools within the district. When figures based on the same methodology are available, this type of indicator can also be used for comparisons. We might for example compare the situation of schools in Vilnius with the one of schools in Prague or the increase in children with a migrant background in Vilnius with the development in Klaipėda over the same time period. All of these usages are very common and can certainly be considered very traditional tools of policy planning and monitoring. Choosing the wrong indicators or working with incorrect explanations can nevertheless lead to fallacies. Sticking to our example, we might be surprised to learn that the number of children having a migrant background is actually decreasing. Such an unexpected change could possibly be the result of changes in their status (naturalization). In this case, we might ask ourselves if citizenship was the right choice for an indicator. As discussed in the previous chapter, in some surveys citizenship is for such reasons replaced with place of birth. Depending on what we are actually interested in for our survey, this indicator might however be misleading, since many children from migrant families might have been born in the new home country. Therefore the best indicator in our fictitious example might possibly have been birth country of father or mother, and our measurement should be reconceptualised from number of foreigners to population with a foreign background (though such a focus might be problematic since it could have
the [possibly non-intended] effect of socially constructing “otherness” yet might be legitimate if there are indications that the members of this group are in a disadvantaged social position).

Increasingly, indicators are used not only to monitor a development, but also to assess this development against a target indicator (benchmarking). Another way of using an indicator is to measure or control the performance of institutions. In our example, the school district might have the aim of avoiding a concentration of migrant children in certain schools (a legitimate reason for this could be prevention of segregation). This policy goal could for example be translated in the measurable indicator of a maximal difference of 20 per cent between the average share of children with migrant background and the share in any local school. Indicators might also be introduced to measure the performance of the institutions in question. In our example, it could for example be measured whether classes with immigrant children are larger and as well equipped as classes without immigrant children. The advantage of using such procedures is seen in the possibility of measuring performance. This way the responsible officials and politicians regularly gain an overview of performance. Focussing on indicators is not without its negative sides, however. As is the case with any modelling of reality, the selected indicators will not mirror reality in its entire complexity. If reality becomes (for voters, the media, etc.) visible mostly in the indicators, decision-makers might neglect other costs to reach the set goals (a phenomenon well known to all readers familiar with the problems of the socialist planned economies). In our example, policymakers might for example discriminate against young migrant families with children in the provision of housing in order to not have their children attending schools in the district. Another possibility is statistical tricks: schools with a large number of migrants might be administratively united with a school that lacks migrants, without actually changing anything on the ground. Or schools might react to the undesired transfer of migrant children by establishing migrants-only classes (a widespread strategy when it comes to Roma). In view of such scenarios, one might argue that a better indicator than migrant children per school would be migrant children per class.

In the area of migration and integration, the use of indicators is currently very much promoted by the European Union. One of the reasons for this development is the desire to better compare developments in the 27 member states. A quite widespread initiative in this field was the MIPEX study (conducted by the Migration Policy Group and financed by the European Commission), which ranked the performance of all member states (with the exception of Romania and Bulgaria) in regard to their migrant integration.
practices. The ranking is done on the basis of normative indicators that, somewhat simplified, value the provision of rights to migrants and non-bureaucratic procedures positively (high ranking), while weak rights and large bureaucratic obstacles are valued negatively (low ranking). While it is possible to argue both about the normative tendency of this research and the reliability of information in regard to some countries, the resulting map, which marks a country’s degree of friendliness towards migrants by colour, is nevertheless informative, as the existence of certain clusters of countries reveal the existence and prevalence of geographical and historical patterns. We should, however, be aware that the normative scale used by the study’s author is not a scale that would be accepted by the more restrictive member states. It is therefore not realistic to expect that low-ranking countries such as Austria will feel a need to move even some steps into the direction of best-ranking Sweden.

Challenges for the use of indicators in Central and Eastern European countries

We explained above that indicators can be used in a number of ways. While elementary use is possible in any country with reliable statistics, benchmarking requires a political agreement on strategic goals. In a situation where such goals are not clearly defined and therefore subject to ad hoc changes, it is almost impossible to measure “progress” with the help of indicators. In some cases, evaluators help themselves in such situation by referring to policy documents of a more general character, such as national action plans for social inclusion. This is certainly helpful to build up a powerful argument. In the opinion of the author of this article, however, it is important to realize that the actual significance of such plans is limited if they are perceived to be not much more than a paper exercise. As outlined in this chapter, neither the actual situation of migrants nor the regulatory framework established to administer and control migrants evolved in countries like the Czech Republic on the basis of a systematic political strategy, but as the “spontaneous” and uncoordinated result of interventions by a multitude of players with very different interests. The chaotic dimension is further strengthened by frequent government crises, the high fluctuation among state officials, and the shift of duties among state ministries. In such an environment, even the availability of performance data might not necessarily lead to well-prepared intervention by the state.

The third possibility of using the indicators mentioned above is measuring/controlling the performance of state institutions. Theoretically, it should be expected that any institution has at least some monitoring system in place. If
formalized at all, it is highly unusual in central and Eastern Europe to regularly make results public, since there still seems to be aversion against civic interference in state institutions’ inner life and the washing of one’s dirty laundry in public. Yet the mandatory production and publication of some performance data (e.g., waiting times at alien police and waiting times for visa) might be a quite effective way to improve performance.

The prominent aspects that came to the foreground in the comparative review of three countries can be grouped into issues that can be seen or applied in other countries such as Lithuania. Another group of policy measures of policy indicators may happen to be too specific or too complicated to be transferred into another national context. Nevertheless, the various policy options should be viewed as a resource that can help in building a national benchmarking system. It is the author’s hope that this review will serve at least as an example to illustrate the connections between policy goals and indicators for tracking achievement.

Policy relevance for Lithuania:
Challenges and Recommendations

Migration motives and group dynamics

Costs and risks with regard to labour immigration

Economic development policies that depend on the recruitment of foreign manual labourers should be carefully evaluated in regard to their human and societal costs and potential security risks. Costs and risks that need to be considered especially carefully are:

- Non-equal treatment and exploitation of foreign workers;
- Potential of humanitarian disasters as a consequence of sudden mass unemployment and the resulting loss of income, health care, and housing;
- Security risk linked to the emergence of criminal organisations involved in the recruitment of foreign workers;
- Security risks linked to foreign workers choosing criminal strategies when they face threats (loss of income, housing, and lack of access to health care);
- Undesired impact on social position of domestic workforce (pressure on wages, emergence of new employment structures, and opportunities for vulnerable segments of domestic workforce).
**Costs and risks with regard to circular migration**

Circular migration schemes that are meant to satisfy short-term labour needs may turn problematic when the circularity depends on restriction of integration (e.g. insecurity and temporary character of status and restrictions on unification with family members). This could increase the potential for exploitation. When migrants nevertheless remain, the experience of obstacles to integration might later discourage them from seeking integration. If circular migration schemes are nevertheless implemented, it seems advisable to restrict the participation to geographically proximate countries, where cultural and linguistic barriers are lower and commuting schemes (consumption of earned money in country of origin with family left home) are possible. It also seems advisable to create in such schemes possibilities to change the migrants’ status into the status of permanent immigrants (e.g. on the basis of merit, proof of long-term need of labour market, or language). In case there is no coherent migration policy, it might be helpful to consider the rights of temporary migrants (e.g. health care, contribution to the social security and pension system and rights towards these systems, bodies responsible in case of misuse, membership in trade unions, control of recruitment agencies, and validity of contracts signed in country of origin) in agreements with the sending countries.

Circular migration schemes seem problematic when migrants come from non-democratic countries that offer no protection of migrants’ legal rights and could even lead to an export of the undemocratic society’s methods of control. Payments of migrants to their family home and various kinds of payments to embassy officials that are involved in organizing the migration flow might be criticized for stabilizing an undemocratic regime. On the other hand, migration might in the case of such countries also have the effect of increasing the circulation of free information and the stimulation of personal cross-border contacts. Both of these aspects should be considered when considering the case of Belarus, which is otherwise due to its geographical proximity and the existence of historical—and in a certain way also linguistic—ties certainly a very suitable candidate as a country of origin for labour migrants to Lithuania.

**Vulnerability of labour immigrants**

Even short-term migrants should have the possibility to change their employer. Otherwise the employer is likely to gain a highly dominant position, which invites misuse and exploitation. In situations of job loss, there should be realistic timelines (e.g. 45 days in the case of short-term migrants) for finding a new job before unemployment has an effect on the legal status of the person in question).
Infrastructure of refugee integration programmes

Existing experiences with the integration of refugees and potentially also the structures created for the integration of refugees should be used when considering the integration of labour migrants. While administrative divisions will lead in many cases to different approaches towards different groups of foreigners, we should realize that these divisions might not reflect the actual structure within migrant communities, as motives and justifications for migrating could overlap.

Integration issues and policy recommendations

Social rights

The most effective way of preventing the abuse of migrants is the strengthening of their legal position towards employers and also state officials. The formal demand for legal treatment is not sufficient if migrants are not aware of their rights or are in a position where they are afraid. It is therefore necessary to actively inform migrants of their rights and to create bodies that will provide assistance to migrants who experience unfair treatment. In regard to state officials, it is problematic if decisions (e.g., on visas) are solely based on the discretion of officials, since this clearly opens the way to corruption. To reduce the room for corruption, rules should be clearly established and published in a well-accessible form.

If the employment through agencies and other forms of intermediaries is tolerated, the final beneficiary of the work should be held accountable in cases of mistreatment or failure to pay salaries. To avoid economic damage to honest companies that were unknowingly co-operating with non-transparent agencies, companies should at the same time be given the right to control, or even undertake directly, crucial activities such as wage payments or payments to social security. To minimize illegal employment, such a mechanism might also be used to hold final beneficiaries accountable for the legal status of the persons working in their premises.

Trade unions

Trade unions should be encouraged to recognize their responsibility towards the position of labour migrants. At the same time, laws that regulate the employment of foreigners should be checked in regard to their effect on the position of trade unions. It seems dangerous—also because of the emerging
negative association of foreigners as breakers of picket lines—if the employment of foreigners is regulated in a way that undermines the position of trade unions and the domestic workforce in general.

**Stimulation of immigration**

If the creation of programmes for the stimulation of migration is considered, the attractiveness of Lithuania as a destination country should not be overestimated. It might be a good idea to compensate applicants for certain less attractive factors (e.g. complicated language, remote location, lack of an ethnic community) with relatively generous provisions concerning length of stay and the possibility of bringing family members.

**Legalization of status**

Minor administrative mistakes, such as a delay in extending a permit, should be penalized with fees and not with a change of status into the one of an illegal migrant. For certain cases of illegal migrants, the state should offer possibilities to legalize their stay.

**Structures, strategies and institutions**

**Social actors of immigration-integration strategy**

State representatives should invest the time to formulate a migration strategy that is accepted by major political parties and social partners. The formulation of the strategy should include other relevant groups in society, such as churches, think tanks, NGOs, and experts in academia. The strategy should not make the mistake of regarding integration, migration, and even assimilation as basically the same thing. It should, however, deal with migration and integration issues in the same time since it would be counterproductive to have contradicting policy conceptions in both fields.

**Acceptance of immigrants**

In the area of migration, the strategy should state how and by whom the labour needs of the Lithuanian economy will be identified. It should further outline mechanisms for the selection of citizens from third countries interested in working in Lithuania and establish transparent criteria for their acceptance
(e.g. basic knowledge of Lithuanian, and/or Russian or English, proof of skills, financial guarantees, and expressed interest or contract with employer). Care needs to be taken not to establish rules or require documents that are mutually exclusive or that are very hard to fulfil (e.g. proof of employment contract before visa is issued).

Local integration initiatives

In the area of integration, the strategy should include objectives and activities for both the state and local and regional level. In areas where migrants are present, regions and municipalities should be given resources to create bodies responsible for the preparation of local integration strategies and the realization of activities supporting the local integration of foreigners. These strategies should focus, not exclusively, on: education of migrants and their family members, cultural activities (also targeting the majority population), social and legal counselling, and activities to prevent spatial segregation.

Where possible, the concerns of foreigners should not be dealt with by state bodies, but by the usual municipal and regional administrations.

Sources

consequence of the economic crises – risks and potential impact on security situation in the Czech Republic (Information for members of Czech government).


Jelínková, M., The North Koreans in the Czech Republic: The Silent Workers. Published online: Migration Online, 30.03.2006.


Lidové Noviny (17.11.2008) Vietnemci nedostanou víza (Vietnamese do not get visas).


Vidlík, M. (a) Jak si vyrobit nepřítele (How to create enemies to ourselves). In: Lidové Noviny. 5.12.2008.

Vidlík, M. (b) Jak se u nás vyrábějí otroci (How slaves are made in our country). In: Lidové Noviny. 31.10.2008.


MIGRACIJOS IR INTEGRACIJOS POLITIKOS STEBĖJIMO SISTEMOS KŪRIMAS: ČEKIJOS, LENKIJOS IR ŠVEDIJOS ATVEJAI

Jakob Hurrle
MULTICULTURAL CENTRE PRAGUE, ČEKIJA

Santrauka. Straipsnis, parengtas kaip projekto „Lietuvoje gyvenančių trečiųjų šalių piliečių integracijos politikos vertinimo principai ir rodikliai” dalis, analizuoja atrinktus Čekijos ir Lenkijos migrantų integracijos aspektus. Šios dvi šalys Centrinės ir Rytų Europos regione pritraukia daugiausiai imigrantų. Čekijos ir Lenkijos integracijos politika yra lyginama su Švedijos, turinčios ilgalaikęs integracijos programas, patirčių. Stripsnyje taip pat pristatomos metodologinės problemos, su kuriomis susidarius Čekija, Lenkija, Švedija, norėdamos sukurti migracijos ir integracijos politikos vertinimo rodiklius ir siekdamas surinkti statistinius duomenis apie migrantus, bei aptariami pasirinkti įvairių problemų sprendimo būdai. Straipsnyje taip pat pristatomos metodologinės problemos, su kuriomis susidarius Čekija, Lenkija, Švedija, norėdamos sukurti migracijos ir integracijos politikos vertinimo rodiklius ir siekdamas surinkti statistinius duomenis apie migrantus, bei aptariami pasirinkti įvairių problemų sprendimo būdai. Straipsnyje taip pat pristatoma lyginamoji analizė pateikti naujus medžiagos politikos priemonių formavimo diskusijoms šalyse, kuriose dar tik kuriama migracijos ir integracijos politika, tarp jų ir Lietuvoje.

Pagrindiniai žodžiai: MIGRACIJOS POLITIKA, INTEGRACIJOS POLITIKA, MIGRANTAI.